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DEATH OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
NATALIE NANASI∞ 
ABSTRACT 
Applicants seeking asylum in the United States must demonstrate that they 
fear persecution on account of one of five protected grounds—race, religion, na-
tional origin, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group (PSG). 
The PSG ground has long been the most complex and challenging avenue for re-
lief, and in the Trump era, already precarious protections for vulnerable people 
such as survivors of intimate partner and gang violence were further impaired. 
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ first, and longstanding, definition of a 
PSG in Matter of Acosta required members to possess “common immutable char-
acteristics,” those that, like the other statutory grounds, either could not be 
changed or were so fundamental that one should not be required to change them. 
This Article reveals that since the Board imposed two additional requirements—
that PSGs possess social distinction and particularity—over a decade ago, the 
Board has recognized only two new particular social groups. Both of those 
groups, one protecting survivors of domestic violence and the other family mem-
bership, were invalidated by Trump administration attorneys general. Thus, when 
examining BIA jurisprudence, it appears that the particular social group is dead. 
This Article discusses the evolution of the particular social group ground in 
both domestic and international law and reviews the disparate treatment of PSGs 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal circuit courts. It then makes 
recommendations—including legislation, reconsideration of the attorney gen-
eral’s broad authority to overrule cases using the power of self-referral, and con-
sideration of whether Chevron deference remains appropriate for PSG jurispru-
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Asylum seekers faced relentless attacks in the Trump era. The former presi-
dent “consistently characterized asylum as a ‘loophole’ in U.S. southern border 
security” and sought to curtail both access to asylum and the rights of those seek-
ing refuge in the United States.1 After instituting a “zero tolerance” policy,2 under 
which asylum seekers who enter the United States without authorization are 
 
1. SARAH PIERCE, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION-RELATED POLICY CHANGES IN THE 
FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 18 (2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
research/immigration-policy-changes-two-years-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/9VLV-TU
GS]. 
2. Memorandum from the Off. of the Att’y Gen. to Fed. Prosecutors Along the Sw. Border 
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-
criminal-illegal-entry [https://perma.cc/7XLH-AZEM]. 
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criminally prosecuted, the administration separated children from their parents de-
tained pursuant to the new directive.3 A rule promulgated in July 2019 stated that 
anyone who had passed through a country other than their own while en route to 
the southern border of the United States would be denied asylum if they did not 
apply for protection in the transit country.4 The administration placed limits on 
the number of individuals who are permitted to enter the United States to apply 
for asylum at ports of entry each day; this “metering” policy led to people “waiting 
weeks or sometimes months for their opportunity to request asylum.”5 Those who 
were able to enter and declare their intention to apply for asylum were sent to 
Mexico to await future court hearings.6 Others, including children, are held in 
overcrowded and unhygienic detention centers.7 Those who can overcome the 
newly heightened standards8 for passing credible fear interviews9 are ineligible 
for release on bond if transferred from expedited to full removal proceedings.10 
Asylum applicants are no longer entitled to full evidentiary hearings,11 are being 
 
3. See DHS, Fact Sheet: Zero Tolerance Immigration Prosecutions – Families (June 15, 
2019), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/zero-tolerance-immigration-prosecutions-family-fact-sheet 
[https://perma.cc/F657-SCWX]. 
4. See Guidelines Regarding New Regulations Governing Asylum and Protection Claims 
from James R. McHenry III, Dir., Dept. of Just., to All of EOIR (July 15, 2019), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/eoir/file/1183026/download [https://perma.cc/4WFP-8TF8]. This followed a prior rule, is-
sued by the former president in November 2018, which barred individuals who did not present them-
selves at a port of entry from applying for asylum. See Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 
(Nov. 9, 2018). 
5. James Frederick, ‘Metering’ at the Border, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 29, 2019), https://
www.npr.org/2019/06/29/737268856/metering-at-the-border [https://perma.cc/XB4Q-JUSD] (not-
ing that “19,000 asylum-seekers are waiting on the Mexican side of the border for their chance to 
request asylum in the U.S.”). 
6. DHS, Migrant Protection Protocols (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2019/01
/24/migrant-protection-protocols [https://perma.cc/N5M8-D5VL]. 
7. See Andrew Gumbel, ‘They Were Laughing at Us’: Immigrants Tell of Cruelty, Illness and 
Filth in US Detention, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep
/12/us-immigration-detention-facilities [https://perma.cc/AJ3H-VUMU]. 
8. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, LESSON PLAN OVERVIEW: CREDIBLE FEAR OF 
PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS (2019), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/mkt
/11/10239/10146/2019%20training%20document%20for%20asylum%20screenings.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FC6H-GWFS]. The newly issued lesson plans also removed previously existing guidance 
for officers to consider trauma and cultural background when assessing the credibility of applicants. 
Id. See also CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC. & AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N, CREDIBLE FEAR 
LESSON PLANS COMPARISON CHART (2019), https://www.aila.org/infonet/updated-credible-fear-les-
son-plans-comparison [https://perma.cc/EX9B-WV5Y]. 
9. Individuals who enter the United States without authorization and claim fear of returning 
to their home country must demonstrate “credible fear” in order to remain in the United States. 
8 C.F.R. § 1208.30 (2020). During the credible fear interview, an asylum officer determines whether 
there is a “reasonable possibility” that the applicant could establish eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.31(c) (2020). 
10. See Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509 (Att’y Gen. 2019). 
11. See Matter of E-F-H-L, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
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charged fees for their applications for the first time in history,12 and can be denied 
work permits13 as they wait years for their applications to be adjudicated.14 And 
after years of methodically chipping away at the rights and dignity of asylum seek-
ers, in June 2020, the Trump administration launched its most significant attack, 
when it issued comprehensive regulations that would systematically dismantle 
nearly every aspect of our nation’s asylum laws.15 
Another significant but underexplored way that the Trump administration at-
tempted to undermine the rights of asylum seekers was by limiting the already 
precarious jurisprudence of “particular social group” (PSG), one of the five 
grounds for asylum in the United States. Unlike the other bases for asylum—race, 
religion, national origin, and political opinion—the particular social group ground 
is more subjective and open to interpretation. It is not defined in either interna-
tional or domestic law, which has led to varied and evolving definitions across 
time and jurisdictions. As its jurisprudence has developed, the PSG ground has 
provided critical protections to many fleeing serious harms, in particular, harms 
that were not foreseen when the asylum regime was created in the aftermath of 
World War II, such as intimate partner abuse, gang-based violence, and persecu-
tion of LGBTQ and disabled individuals.  
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative body to 
interpret U.S. immigration laws, defined particular social group in the landmark 
1985 case Matter of Acosta.16 Its definition—requiring groups to possess common 
immutable characteristics—drew from international interpretations as well as es-
tablished concepts of statutory construction. Several PSGs were recognized by the 
Board after the Acosta decision,17 but approximately 20 years later, the court 
 
12. See Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Require-
ments, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,788 (Aug. 3, 2020). 
13. See Removal of 30-Day Processing Provision for Asylum Applicant-Related Form I–765 
Employment Authorization Applications, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,502 (June 22, 2020); Asylum Application, 
Interview, and Employment Authorization for Applicants, 85 Fed. Reg. 38,532 (June 26, 2020). 
14. See Denise Lu & Derek Watkins, Court Backlog May Prove Bigger Barrier for Migrants 
Than Any Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/24/us
/migrants-border-immigration-court.html [https://perma.cc/6X4B-PB5E] (describing long delays at 
immigration courts, and reporting that “asylum seekers accounted for about half of new immigration 
cases [in 2018], at a record 159,590 cases” and that “pending cases have increased by nearly 50 
percent since Mr. Trump took office in 2017”); DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review Ad-
judication Statistics - Pending Cases (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file
/1060836/download [https://perma.cc/VC8A-EUXP] (reporting a backlog of nearly 900,000 cases 
in U.S. immigration courts). 
15. See Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable 
Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36,264 (June 15, 2020). The regulations impact nearly every facet of 
asylum law, including who may enter the United States to seek asylum, who is eligible for a hearing 
before an Immigration Judge, and the definitions of key terms in the refugee definition, such as 
persecution, political opinion, and particular social group. See id. 
16. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
17. See infra Section III.A. 
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introduced two new criteria—particularity18 and social distinction19—to the PSG 
definition. Since that time, the Board has recognized only two new particular so-
cial groups: a group encompassing survivors of domestic violence in 2014,20 and 
a group defined by family membership in 2017.21  
As was extensively detailed in the media,22 in June 2018, Attorney General 
(AG) Sessions issued Matter of A-B-,23 overruling the case that granted asylum to 
those fleeing intimate partner abuse. A little over a year later, AG Barr overruled 
Matter of L-E-A-,24 the case that recognized family as a particular social group. 
The actions of these two attorneys general have effectively eradicated the partic-
ular social group ground, as the Board of Immigration Appeals has not recognized 
a valid social group that its parent agency, the Department of Justice (DOJ), has 
upheld since new requirements were added fifteen years ago.25 
 
18. See Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008) (defining “particularity” as 
“whether the proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the 
group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons”). 
19. See Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 (B.I.A. 2006) (“The social visibility of the 
members of a claimed social group is an important consideration in identifying the existence of a 
‘particular social group’ for the purpose of determining whether a person qualifies as a refugee.”); 
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014) (renaming the “social visibility” ele-
ment “social distinction,” and holding that “[a]n applicant for asylum . . . based on ‘membership in 
a particular social group’ must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a 
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the 
society in question”); Matter of W-G-R, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 208 (B.I.A. 2014) (pronouncing the 
same). 
20. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389–90 (B.I.A. 2014) (finding that “the lead 
respondent, a victim of domestic violence in her native country, is a member of a particular social 
group composed of ‘married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship’”). 
21. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42 (B.I.A. 2017) (“We agree with the parties that 
the members of an immediate family may constitute a particular social group.”). 
22. See e.g., Katie Benner & Caitlin Dickerson, Sessions Says Domestic and Gang Violence 
Are Not Grounds for Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us
/politics/sessions-domestic-violence-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/WD3W-LTM2]; Evan Halper, 
Trump Administration Moves to Block Victims of Gang Violence and Domestic Abuse from Claiming 
Asylum, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-sessions-asylum-
20180611-story.html [https://perma.cc/F83B-EW5C]; Elise Foley, Trump Administration Restricts 
Asylum Access for Victims of Gang and Domestic Violence, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/sessions-immigrants-asylum_n_5b1e981de4b0adfb826c3204 
[https://perma.cc/72W6-GGPB]. 
23. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
24. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 40. 
25. As will be detailed, infra Section IV, a small number of federal courts have declined to 
follow the BIA’s PSG jurisprudence. Further, because decisions of a federal circuit court are binding 
on the BIA when it considers cases arising in that circuit, the PSG is alive and well in those jurisdic-
tions. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing NLRB v. Ashkenazy Prop. 
Mgmt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991) (asserting that “[a] 
federal agency is obligated to follow circuit precedent in cases originating within that circuit”)). 
However, the BIA’s decisions remain critically important in this area because they provide uni-
formity and, perhaps more importantly, are a statement of values from the agency tasked with inter-
preting immigration law. 
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This Article describes and explains the particular social group’s evolution and 
demise. Section II details the PSG definition in both international and domestic 
law. Section III discusses the application of the U.S. definition by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, which has imposed requirements that are unduly restrictive 
and inconsistent with international law. Section IV examines the federal courts of 
appeals’ review of the BIA’s PSG jurisprudence, with some circuit courts accept-
ing and others rejecting the administrative court’s evolving definition. Section V 
proposes ways to resuscitate the particular social group, including through legis-
lative action, addressing the overuse of attorney general certification, and a reex-
amination of whether Chevron deference remains appropriate for PSG jurispru-
dence. Section VI concludes.  
II. 
EVOLUTION OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP DEFINITION 
The term “particular social group” is not defined in either the international 
treaties or domestic statutes in which it originated. Neither the United Nations nor 
U.S. legislative history provide insight into the meaning of the term.26 As such, 
“[b]oth courts and commentators have struggled to define” the phrase.27 This sec-
tion traces the origins and evolution of the definition of particular social group, 
first in the international community and in its eventual adoption and modification 
in the United States, in an effort to better understand its meaning and significance.  
A. International Definitions 
The grounds for asylum that are widely in use across the world today were 
established in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.28 Nations 
came together to protect European refugees who had been displaced in the after-
math of World War II.29 Sixteen years later, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees expanded the scope of the Convention to refugees beyond Eu-
ropeans impacted by the second World War.30 Together, the Convention and the 
 
26. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985) (“Congress did not indicate 
what it understood [the particular social group] ground of persecution to mean, nor is its meaning 
clear in the Protocol.”). 
27. Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993). 
28. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
29. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, The 1951 Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol 1 (Sept. 2011), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/back-
ground/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-refugees-its-1967-protocol.html [https://perma
.cc/KL26-R2P2] [hereinafter UNHCR Convention Background]. 
30. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The Protocol incorporates the Convention by reference, stating: 
“The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply Articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Con-
vention to refugees as hereinafter defined.” Art. 1, ¶ 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. The 
refugee definition in the Protocol is nearly identical to that in the Convention; only the references to 
“events occurring before 1 January 1951” are removed. Id. 
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Protocol “remain the cornerstone of refugee protection” to this day.31 The United 
States acceded to the Protocol in 1968 and is therefore bound by all the substantive 
provisions of the Refugee Convention.32  
The Convention defines a refugee as an individual who: 
[o]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwill-
ing to return to it.33 
This refugee definition was developed over a series of meetings at the Con-
ference of Plenipotentiaries held in Geneva in 1951. At the third meeting of the 
conference, the Swedish representative proposed an amendment to add member-
ship of “a particular social group” as a ground for asylum.34 In support of his 
proposal, he simply noted that “experience had shown that certain refugees had 
been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups. The draft Con-
vention made no provision for such cases, and one designed to cover them should 
accordingly be included.”35 At a later meeting, he added that “such cases existed, 
and it would be as well to mention them explicitly.”36  
The conference unanimously adopted the amendment to add “particular social 
group” to the refugee definition without discussion, debate, or comment. Scholars 
and jurists have speculated about the drafter’s intentions, suggesting that the PSG 
ground was included to protect against persecution for reasons that could not be 
foreseen37 or “in order to stop a possible gap in the coverage of the U.N. Conven-
tion.”38 But in the absence of a written historical record, a conclusive answer re-
mains elusive. 
 
31. UNHCR Convention Background, supra note 29, at 1. 
32. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 30, 19 U.S.T. at 6257. 
33. 1951 Convention, supra note 28, at art. 1. 
34. U.N. GAOR, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Per-
sons, 3d mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/SR.3 (July 3, 1951). 
35. Id. 
36. U.N. GAOR, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Per-
sons, 19th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.2/SR.19 (Nov. 26, 1951). 
37. See, e.g., ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219–
20 (A.W. Sijthoff ed., 1996). 
38. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985). 
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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)39 attempted 
to provide some clarity by issuing guidelines on the particular social group ground 
in 2002.40 A product of the Global Consultations on the International Protection 
of Refugees, the PSG Guidelines are intended to provide “legal interpretive guid-
ance for governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary.”41 
As the Guidelines were issued more than fifty years after the refugee definition 
was created, their standards inherently take into account nations’ analysis and ap-
plication of the PSG ground in the intervening time.  
The Guidelines recognize that PSG “is the ground with least clarity” but that 
any “proper interpretation must be consistent with the object and purpose of the 
Convention,” which requires that the term be understood “in an evolutionary man-
ner, open to the diverse and changing nature of groups in various societies and 
evolving international human rights norms.”42 UNHCR then describes two poten-
tial ways in which the term “particular social group” had come to be understood 
in international jurisprudence—the “protected characteristics” approach and the 
“social perception” approach.  
A particular social group that is defined by protected characteristics requires 
members of the group to possess “a characteristic or association that is so funda-
mental to human dignity that a person should not be compelled to forsake it.”43 
The protected characteristics approach is followed by many “major common law 
countries, [including] the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom.”44 Courts in Canada, New Zealand, and the U.K. utilized theories of 
 
39. The UNHCR functions as the “administrative body for the Refugee Convention.” Nicho-
las R. Bednar & Margaret Penland, Asylum’s Interpretive Impasse: Interpreting “Persecution” and 
“Particular Social Group” Using International Human Rights Law, 26 MINN. J. INT’L L. 145, 162 
(2017). 
40. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, Guidelines on International Protection: 
“Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Con-
vention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (May 7, 2002), https://www.un-
hcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d58de2da/guidelines-international-protection-2-membership-par-
ticular-social-group.html [https://perma.cc/H5YB-ZZ8U] [hereinafter UNHCR PSG Guidelines]. 
41. Id. at 1. 
42. Id. at 2. 
43. Id. at 3. The Guidelines elaborate on how “[a] decision-maker adopting this approach 
would examine whether the asserted group is defined: (1) by an innate, unchangeable characteristic, 
(2) by a past temporary or voluntary status that is unchangeable because of its historical permanence, 
or (3) by a characteristic or association that is so fundamental to human dignity that group members 
should not be compelled to forsake it.” Id. 
44. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Partic-
ular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 48 (2008). The protected characteristics approach is called 
“immutability” in the United States. See id. at 47–49. See also discussion infra Section II.B. Profes-
sor Marouf details the “significant attention” the “persuasive” reasoning utilized in the Acosta case, 
which established immutability as the test for PSG in the United States, has received in foreign 
courts. Marouf, supra note 44, at 54–57. 
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non-discrimination and human rights—ideas they understood as central to the Ref-
ugee Convention—to arrive at the protected characteristics approach.45  
A particular social group defined by social perception, on the other hand, “ex-
amines whether . . . a group shares a common characteristic which makes them a 
cognizable group or sets them apart from society at large.”46 Australia is the only 
common law country to define a PSG by social perception.47 Notably, however, 
the High Court of Australia rejected a purely subjective approach to social percep-
tion, which it believed would be an unreliable indicator of whether a particular 
social group existed and also impose a criterion that had no basis in the 1951 Con-
vention.48  
The Guidelines review both methods of defining “particular social group” and 
ultimately recommend a single definition that merges the two approaches, defin-
ing PSG as “a group of persons who share a common characteristic . . . or who are 
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is in-
nate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or 
the exercise of one’s human rights.”49 The term “or” in UNHCR’s definition is 
critical, as it indicates that the analysis should proceed in sequential steps: “[i]f a 
claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic determined to be 
neither unalterable or fundamental[,] further analysis should be undertaken to de-
termine whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that 
society.”50 In other words, the UNHCR Guidelines do not create dual require-
ments; a particular social group defined by immutability or protected characteris-
tics alone is sufficient.51  
Ultimately, a review of international law reveals that the particular social 
group ground stemmed from international agreement, and the definition ultimately 
arrived at similar international consensus. Intended to be construed broadly and 
with a recognition of its humanitarian origins, a valid PSG under international law 
 
45. Id. at 54–57. 
46. UNHCR PSG Guidelines, supra note 40, at art. 7. 
47. The High Court of Australia created the social perception approach for defining particular 
social group in Applicant A and Another v Minister for Immigr. and Ethnic Affs. [1997] 190 CLR 
225 (Austl.). 
48. Applicant S v Minister for Immigr. and Multicultural Affs. [2004] 217 CLR 387, 421–22 
(Austl.). 
49. UNHCR PSG Guidelines, supra note 40, at art. 11 (emphasis added). 
50. Id. at art. 13 (emphasis added). 
51. In a 2009 amicus brief, the UNHCR explained its goal in defining PSG this way as giving 
“validity to both approaches, which may frequently overlap.” Brief of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner at 10, Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. 
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 08-4564), 2009 WL 8754827, at *10. The agency 
confirmed that its intent “was by no means . . . to create a further requirement nor to serve as a basis 
to exclude otherwise eligible refugees from protection. . . . [W]hile social perceptions may provide 
evidence of immutability or the fundamental nature of a protected characteristic, heightened social 
perception is merely an ‘indicator’ of the social group’s existence rather than an additional factor.” 
Id. 
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is made up of members who possess immutable protected characteristics or who 
are perceived as a group by the society in which they exist. As the next Section 
will demonstrate, the U.S. definition also includes these requirements but has im-
plemented them in a way that significantly narrows the PSG’s reach.  
B. Domestic Definitions 
It was not until 1980 that the United States enacted legislation to implement 
its obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol. When Congress 
passed the Refugee Act of 1980, it adopted a refugee definition in the Immigration 
and Naturalization Act (INA) that was taken almost word-for-word from the 1951 
Convention:  
any person who is outside any country of such person’s national-
ity . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.52 
As a result, “[a]sylum law is one of the most thoroughly international areas 
of U.S. law.”53 
In another parallel to the Convention and Protocol, the phrase “membership 
in a particular social group” is not defined in the INA or in the Code of Federal 
Regulations.54 It was not until 1985 that the Board of Immigration Appeals pro-
vided the first definition of the term in Matter of Acosta.55  
Mr. Acosta was a 36-year-old taxi driver from El Salvador. He founded a co-
op that became a target for guerillas, who tried to force the drivers to participate 
in work stoppages in order to advance their goal of harming the Salvadoran econ-
omy. The co-op refused to comply, and the guerillas retaliated with threats, beat-
ings, and murders. Mr. Acosta was beaten and received three death threats that 
were similar to those received by others who were ultimately killed. He fled to the 
United States and claimed asylum based on his membership in the particular social 
 
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018). Accord 1951 Convention, supra note 28, art. 1. 
53. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths 
Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1061 (2011). See also Joan Fitzpatrick, The In-
ternational Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (1997) (explaining how U.S. 
refugee law draws heavily from international standards). 
54. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)(A) (2020). 
55. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“[W]e interpret the phrase 
‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ to mean persecution that is 
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, 
immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or 
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership.”). 
5_NANASI_45.2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/6/2021  12:12 PM 
270 N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 45:260 
groups of “COTAXI drivers” and “persons engaged in the transportation industry 
of El Salvador.”56  
In attempting to determine whether Mr. Acosta’s proposed particular social 
groups were viable, the Board first had to define the term. The Board began by 
utilizing the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a Latin phrase that translates to “of the 
same kind” and holds that “general words used in an enumeration with specific 
words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific words.”57 In 
this case, the general term “particular social group” appears alongside four more 
specific terms—race, religion, national origin, and political opinion. Thus, the 
Board found that PSG should be defined in a manner that is consistent with the 
other four grounds for asylum protection.58 
Applying ejusdem generis, the BIA defined a “particular social group” as a 
“group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”59 The 
common characteristic “must be one that the members of the group . . . cannot 
change,” like one’s race or nationality, or one that they “should not be required to 
change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences,” like 
their religion or political opinion.60 Only when defined in this way, the Board held, 
“does the mere fact of group membership become something comparable to the 
other four grounds of persecution under the Act.”61 The Board further explained 
that the shared characteristics that could potentially comprise a particular social 
group might be “innate . . . such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circum-
stances . . . might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership 
or land ownership.”62  
The analysis in Acosta derived from close textual scrutiny and resulted in a 
definition that “is sufficiently open-ended to allow for evolution in much the same 
way as has occurred with the four other grounds, but not so vague as to admit 
persons without a serious basis for claim to international protection.”63 It also 
served as a model for other countries’ PSG definitions.64  
The definition established by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of 
Acosta remained good law, and led to recognition of several PSGs,65 until a series 
of cases in the early 2000s imposed additional requirements for applicants seeking 
relief based on their membership in a particular social group. The first of those 
cases was Matter of C-A-.66  
 
56. Id. at 232. 






63. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 161 (1st ed. 1991). 
64. See Marouf, supra note 44, at 56–57. 
65. See infra Section III. 
66. Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006). 
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The applicant in Matter of C-A- was a Columbian baker who was friendly 
with both the head of security for the Cali drug cartel and the General Counsel for 
the city of Cali. After sharing information he learned about the cartel with the 
General Counsel, both Mr. C-A- and his son were threatened and assaulted. Mr. 
C-A- eventually fled to the United States at the recommendation of the General 
Counsel and sought asylum based on his membership in the particular social group 
of “noncriminal informants working against the Cali drug cartel.”  
In analyzing Mr. C-A-’s claim, the Board said that it would “continue to ad-
here to the Acosta formulation” but “consider[] as a relevant factor the extent to 
which members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as 
members of a social group.”67 Applying this new “social visibility” test to the case 
at hand, the BIA found that “the very nature of the conduct at issue is such that it 
is generally out of the public view” and could therefore not satisfy the requisite 
social visibility.68 Thus, although the Board did not officially make social visibil-
ity a requirement at this time, it utilized the concept to deny Mr. C-A-’s claim for 
asylum. 
The Board in C-A- also noted that the proposed group was “too loosely de-
fined to meet the requirement of particularity.”69 The following year, the BIA 
elaborated on the concept of particularity in Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, a case 
involving a couple who faced threats and feared extortion, kidnapping, and phys-
ical harm as a result of their status as, and membership in the particular social 
group of, “affluent Guatemalans.”70 The Board held that the proposed group was 
“too amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for determining group mem-
bership” and denied the couple’s claim.71 Particularity was thus cemented as a 
mandatory element of the PSG definition, and groups that were “too subjective, 
inchoate, and variable” were no longer considered valid.72 Additionally, the BIA 
used Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U- as an opportunity to reaffirm social visibility, 
recognizing it as a required factor in the particular social group analysis.73  
A year after Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, the Board issued companion deci-
sions that shed more light on its views regarding the definition of “particular social 
 
67. Id. at 956–57. 
68. Id. at 960. 
69. Id. at 957 (emphasis added). 
70. 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 70–71 (B.I.A. 2007). 
71. Id. at 76. 
72. Id. After Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the Board also determined that the terms “young,” 
see Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–88 (B.I.A. 2008); and “poverty,” see Matter of 
M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239–40 (B.I.A. 2014) (citing Escobar v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 363, 
368 (3d Cir. 2005)); were too subjective and amorphous to satisfy the requirement of particularity. 
73. The Board stated: “In reaffirming the requirement that the shared characteristic of the 
group should generally be recognizable by others in the community. . . .” Matter of A-M-E- & 
J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 74 (emphasis added). 
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group”—Matter of S-E-G-74 and Matter of E-A-G-.75 Both cases involved young 
men fleeing violent gangs in El Salvador; when issued, they were the BIA’s most 
comprehensive articulation of the social visibility and particularity requirements 
to date.76 Blurring the lines between the two requirements, the Board in Matter of 
S-E-G- described “the essence of the particularity requirement” as “whether the 
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that 
the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of 
persons.”77 “The key question,” according to the Board, was “whether the pro-
posed description is sufficiently ‘particular’ or is ‘too amorphous . . . to create a 
benchmark for determining group membership.’”78 Both decisions also addressed 
social visibility and ultimately concluded that the proposed gang-based PSGs were 
insufficiently visible.79 As the Board stated in Matter of S-E-G-, “the respondents 
are . . . not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the 
gang, or who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s interests” because “gangs 
have directed harm against anyone and everyone perceived to have interfered with, 
or who might present a threat to, their criminal enterprises and territorial power.”80  
Another key step in the Board of Immigration Appeals’ efforts to define “par-
ticular social group” was a second set of companion cases: Matter of M-E-V-G-81 
and Matter of W-G-R-.82 The cases were issued in response to federal courts’ calls 
for “more clarity” about the Board’s PSG framework.83 The facts in both cases 
once again centered around young men from Central America fleeing gang-based 
violence. The PSG articulated in Matter of M-E-V-G- was “Honduran youth who 
have been actively recruited by gangs but who have refused to join because they 
oppose the gangs.”84 Mr. W-G-R- asserted, as his basis for protection, the PSG 
“former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their 
gang membership.”85  
The Board used the cases as a vehicle to rename social visibility as “social 
distinction.” Emphasizing that the decisions did not constitute “a new 
 
74. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008). 
75. 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008). 
76. The proposed PSG in S-E-G- was “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruit-
ment efforts by the MS-13 gang and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on 
their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities” and “family 
members of such Salvadoran youth.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 581. The proposed PSG in E-A-G- was 
“persons resistant to gang membership.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 593. 
77. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584. 
78. Id. (quoting Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th Cir. 2008)). 
79. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 593–96; Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587. 
80. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 587. 
81. 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014). 
82. 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014). 
83. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236. An in-depth discussion about the concerns 
expressed by both the federal judiciary and legal scholars can be found infra Section II.B.1. 
84. 26 I. & N. Dec. at 228. 
85. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 209. 
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interpretation,”86 but instead a further explanation of the visibility requirement, 
the Board clarified that social visibility “was never intended to, and does not re-
quire, literal or ‘ocular’ visibility,” as critics had argued.87 In doing so, the Board 
implicitly addressed concerns about the validity of groups like Matter of C-A-’s 
“noncriminal informants,” LGBT individuals, or survivors of intimate partner vi-
olence, who by definition, or for their own safety and protection, were hidden from 
public view and were thus not actually visible to those in the applicant’s society, 
including persecutors.88  
Thus, after eight years of post-Acosta tinkering, the Board’s definition of 
“particular social group” seems to have settled on three required elements: 1) im-
mutability, 2) social distinction, and 3) particularity.  
1. Critiques of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Approach 
The definition of “particular social group” promulgated by the Board of Im-
migration Appeals has been the subject of robust critique. First, as detailed in Sec-
tion II.A, the UNHCR PSG Guidelines provide critical guidance on international 
interpretations of the phrase “particular social group.” The PSG definition sug-
gested by the Guidelines incorporates both the Acosta immutability approach and 
the “social perception” or “social distinction” approach. However, UNHCR con-
siders these to be alternative, as opposed to dual, requirements. As former Immi-
gration Judge (IJ) and Senior Advisor to the BIA Jeffrey Chase stated, “by 
changing the ‘or’ to an ‘and,’ the Board required applicants to establish both 
immutability and social distinction, thus narrowing the ranks of those able to 
qualify,” which is contrary to UNHCR’s intent.89 As such, when the Board cited 
to the Guidelines to support its addition of what was then called social visibility 
to the PSG definition,90 this “justification . . . was most disingenuous.”91  
Another significant concern relates to the Board’s abandonment of traditional 
standards of statutory interpretation. As discussed above, in arriving at its initial 
definition of PSG, the Board utilized the principle of ejusdem generis, which re-
quires words in a group or series to be construed in a manner consistent with one 
 
86. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 253 n.9. The Board further noted that the M-E-V-
G- decision was not a departure from precedent and that the Board still “adhere[d] to [its] prior 
interpretations of [visibility].” Id. at 228, 247. 
87. Id. at 234. 
88. Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006). See also Marouf, supra note 44, 
at 79–88 (discussing the challenges of demonstrating ocular visibility for claims based on sexual 
orientation both because “sexual orientation is not externally visible, and sexual minorities often feel 
compelled to hide their orientation for various reasons”). 
89. Jeffrey S. Chase, The Immigration Court: Issues and Solutions, Lecture at Cornell Law 
School’s Berger International Speaker Series (Mar. 28, 2019) (transcript available at 
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/3/28/i6el1do6l5p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi [https://perma
.cc/CKH2-74ZN]). 
90. Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956, 960. 
91. Chase, supra note 89. 
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another.92 Matter of Acosta created the immutability test for particular social 
group because the other bases for asylum—race, religion, national origin, and po-
litical opinion—are similarly immutable. No additional criterial are required to 
prove the non-PSG asylum grounds. Thus, “the adoption of social visibility sig-
naled abandonment by the Board of an approach that interpreted the PSG ground 
homogenously with the [other asylum] grounds.”93 
The non-PSG grounds do not require proof of social distinction and particu-
larity. For example, in Matter of S-A-, the BIA found that a young Moroccan 
woman was persecuted by her father because her liberal Muslim beliefs differed 
from his conservative religious views, specifically as related to the role of 
women.94 In that case, the Board did not inquire whether Ms. S-A-’s religious 
views were publicly known or whether Muslims were too amorphous of a group 
to receive protection. The Board simply recognized that Ms. S-A- had been perse-
cuted on account of her religion and granted her relief. Similarly, the law does not 
require inquiry beyond evidence of nationality if, for example, a woman claims 
persecution in Eritrea based on her Ethiopian ancestry.95 As such, because the 
BIA’s “particular social group” definition demands more than what is needed to 
prove the other four grounds for asylum, it violates the principle of ejusdem gen-
eris. 
The social distinction and particularity requirements are also mutually exclu-
sive. In demanding both elements to satisfy the PSG definition, the Board has cre-
ated an impossible needle to thread. If a proposed group is too big, it risks not 
satisfying the particularity requirement. As the BIA has said, “major segments of 
the population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group.”96 Yet, if a 
group is defined discretely enough to be sufficiently particular, it could fail to sat-
isfy the requirement of social distinction, because a small group is unlikely to be 
perceived as a group by society. 
This catch-22 is not the only one relating to size. The Board’s claim that large 
or numerous groups are not viable PSGs is also inconsistent with the way it ana-
lyzes the other grounds for asylum. For example, 34% of Lebanese citizens are 
Christians, a total of nearly two million people.97 Christians account for approxi-
mately “10% of Syria’s 22 million people.”98 Yet if a Christian sought asylum 
from one of these majority-Muslim countries based on religious persecution, an 
 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 57–59. 
93. Helen P. Grant, Survival of Only the Fittest Social Groups: The Evolutionary Impact of 
Social Distinction and Particularity, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 895, 910 (2017). 
94. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328 (B.I.A. 2000). 
95. See Giday v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 543, 545 (7th Cir. 2006). 
96. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239. 
97. CIA, Lebanon, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/le.html#field-anchor-people-and-society-religions [https://perma.cc/3J3W-6K
AH] (Dec. 17, 2020). 
98. Syria’s Beleaguered Christians, BBC (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-22270455 [https://perma.cc/56U2-7GAP]. 
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immigration court would not be required to deny the claim because too many other 
Christians were at risk of harm. Nor would a group composed of Christians be 
considered “too subjective, inchoate, and variable” even though it could be made 
up of multiple denominations or individuals with diverse levels of religious ob-
servance.99 
What is likely at the root of these “numerosity” limitations is a fear of opening 
the floodgates; in other words, the fear that recognizing a broad group will lead to 
an overwhelming influx of asylum seekers from that group into the United States. 
Yet such concerns are supported neither by the law nor the reality of migration. 
As the UNHCR Guidelines plainly state, “the fact that large numbers of persons 
risk persecution cannot be a ground for refusing to extend international protection 
where it is otherwise appropriate.”100 U.S. courts agree: the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, for one, asserted that it is “antithetical to asylum law to deny refuge 
to a group of persecuted individuals . . . merely because too many have valid 
claims.”101 Even the BIA has recognized that humanitarian immigration law 
should not be influenced by political concerns, noting that the “distinction between 
the goals of refugee law (which protects individuals) and politics (which manages 
the relations between political bodies) should not be confused.”102 
Fear that an expansive definition of particular social group will lead to sky-
rocketing claims also ignores historical reality. As Professor Karen Musalo ex-
plains, opponents of gender-based asylum evoked floodgate concerns as the U.S. 
immigration court system considered a PSG that would provide protection for sur-
vivors of female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C).103 Yet, after Matter of 
Kasinga104 established the right to asylum for women who feared FGM/C, “the 
dire predictions of a flood of women seeking asylum never materialized.”105 Sim-
ilarly, when Canada recognized gender as a basis for asylum, gender-based claims 
“actually declined.”106 The absence of a rise in claims after a change that applied 
 
99. Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007) (quoting the Board’s 
assessment of the characteristic of wealth with regard to a proposed—and rejected—PSG of 
“wealthy Guatemalans”). 
100. UNHCR PSG Guidelines, supra note 40, at 5. 
101. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). See also Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 
1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The BIA’s statement of the purpose and function of the ‘particularity’ 
requirement does not, on its face, impose a numerical limit on a proposed social group or disqualify 
groups that exceed specific breadth or size limitations.”). 
102. Matter of S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492–93 (B.I.A. 1996). 
103. Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call 
to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 132–33 (2007). 
104. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996). 
105. Musalo, supra note 103, at 132. 
106. Id. at 133. As Professor Musalo explains, “the number of women asylum seekers has not 
dramatically increased with the legal recognition of gender claims for protection” for a number of 
reasons, including women’s inability to leave their home countries to seek protection, caretaking 
responsibilities, and lack of resources. Id. 
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to such a significant portion to the world’s population poses a serious challenge to 
arguments based on a fear of opening the floodgates. 
Moreover, Canada is not alone in its willingness to accept broad groups as 
PSGs. As Professor Maryellen Fullerton explains, neither the Canadian nor Ger-
man governments have allowed concerns about size “to influence the development 
of the social group concept.”107 Instead, “they have recognized that other elements 
of the refugee definition will narrow the pool of those who have claims to refugee 
status.”108 For example, even with an expansive PSG definition, the INA still re-
quires asylum seekers to prove that they suffered or fear harm that amounts to 
persecution, that the persecution was perpetrated on account of a protected ground, 
and that the government is either the persecutor or is unable or unwilling to protect 
them from the persecutor.109 Numerous bars to asylum, including for those who 
did not apply within one year of entering the United States,110 have been found to 
 
107. Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due 
to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 561 (1993). 
108. Id. 
109. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018). 
110. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012) (stating that applicants are ineligible for asylum 
unless they demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 
1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.”). Scholars and advocates alike have 
critiqued the requirement to file for asylum within one year of entry as unduly restrictive. See, e.g., 
Roy Xiao, Refuge from Time: How the One-Year Filing Deadline Unfairly Frustrates Valid Asylum 
Claims, 95 N.C. L. REV. 523 (2017) (critiquing the one-year asylum filing deadline); Nat’l Immi-
grant Just. Ctr., Report: The One-Year Asylum Deadline and the BIA: No Protection, No Process 
(Oct. 21, 2010), https://immigrantjustice.org/research-items/report-one-year-asylum-deadline-and-
bia-no-protection-no-process [https://perma.cc/R5YZ-5FHK] (examining how the BIA has ruled on 
issues concerning the one-year filing deadline). 
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have persecuted others,111 or have been convicted of a particularly serious 
crime112 or an aggravated felony113 in the United States, also apply. 
Lastly, but importantly, the current definition of “particular social group” pre-
sents significant disadvantages to pro se litigants. Because asylum seekers do not 
have the right to counsel at government expense, a significant percentage of ap-
plicants appear in immigration court without an attorney.114 An unrepresented mi-
grant faces substantial obstacles in establishing and proving membership in a post-
Acosta particular social group. Language barriers,115 trauma, and lack of famili-
arity with the U.S. legal system present significant challenges in formulating a 
group that would be sufficiently immutable, socially distinct, and particular. The 
impact of these issues was exacerbated by the BIA’s holding in Matter of W-Y-C- 
& H-O-B-, which permits an immigration judge to summarily deny the claim of 
an asylum seeker who fails to articulate a viable PSG in an initial hearing.116  
 
111. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(E) (2020); Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811 
(B.I.A. 1988) (holding that asylum applicants who were persecutors of others are barred from asylum 
relief). The “persecutor bar” has faced criticism for lacking nuance and preventing legitimate victims 
from accessing asylum protection. See, e.g., Kathryn White, A Chance for Redemption: Revising the 
“Persecutor Bar” and “Material Support Bar” in the Case of Child Soldiers, 43 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 222 (2010); Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: To-
ward a More Nuanced Understanding of Modern “Persecution” in the Case of Forced Abortion and 
Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 227, 228 (2007); Nicole Lerescu, Barring Too 
Much: An Argument in Favor of Interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act Section 101(a)(42) 
to Include a Duress Exception, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1889–90 (2007). 
112. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(A) (2020). Scholars and advocates have argued that the “partic-
ularly serious crime” bar is unduly expansive and severe. See, e.g., Mary Holper, Redefining “Par-
ticularly Serious Crimes” in Refugee Law, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (2017); Rebecca Sharp-
less, Balancing Future Harms: The “Particularly Serious Crime” Bar to Refugee Protection, 69 
FLA. L. REV. F. 27, 29–30 (2017); Fatma Marouf, Response to Professor Holper’s Article, Redefin-
ing “Particularly Serious Crimes” in Refugee Law, 69 FLA. L. REV. F. 32, 38 (2017). See generally 
PHILIP L. TORREY, CLARISSA LEHNE, COLLIN POIROT, MANUEL D. VARGAS & JARED FRIEDBERG, 
IMMIGRANT DEF. PROJECT, UNITED STATES FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REFUGEE CONVENTION: 
MISAPPLICATION OF THE PARTICULARLY SERIOUS CRIME BAR TO DENY REFUGEES PROTECTION FROM 
REMOVAL TO COUNTRIES WHERE THEIR LIFE OR FREEDOM IS THREATENED (2018), https://www.im-
migrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/IDP_Harvard_Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc
/C542-PXF4]. 
113. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(2)(D) (2020). The aggravated felony bar is a sweeping limit to asy-
lum access, having “been interpreted broadly to reach misdemeanor offenses such as shoplifting and 
other types of conduct that would not normally be considered ‘aggravated’ or ‘felonious.’” Shoba 
Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
387, 394 (2007). 
114. A study of cases decided between 2007 and 2012 found that only 37% of all immigrants, 
and 14% of detained immigrants, secured representation in immigration court. Ingrid V. Eagly & 
Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(2015). 
115. The Trump administration eliminated interpretation services for initial hearings in immi-
gration court. See Tal Kopan, Trump Administration Ending In-Person Interpreters at Immigrants’ 
First Hearings, S.F. CHRON. (July 3, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Trump-ad-
ministration-ending-in-person-14070403.php [https://perma.cc/Y77K-SAQC]. 
116. 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (B.I.A. 2018). 
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Moreover, the BIA’s heightened PSG standard requires significant proof.117 
The Board has explained that “[e]vidence such as country conditions reports, ex-
pert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, 
historical animosities, and the like may establish that a group exists and is per-
ceived as ‘distinct’ or ‘other’ in a particular society.”118 Obtaining such corrobo-
ration of social distinction is challenging even with an attorney, but likely impos-
sible for the typical asylum applicant who faces significant financial, logistical, 
and psychological constraints.119 
In sum, the Board of Immigration Appeals’ PSG definition ignores interna-
tional guidelines, is discordant with the other asylum grounds, is internally incon-
sistent, relies on unproven floodgates narratives, and harms pro se asylum seekers. 
These concerns prompted challenges to the definition in federal courts; a discus-
sion of that jurisprudence follows in Section IV, after a review of how the BIA 
and DOJ implemented the PSG definition.  
III. 
APPLICATION BY THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ evolving definition of “particular social 
group” led to a varied line of cases from the court after its initial decision in 1985. 
The Board recognized a number of PSGs after Acosta, but when the requirements 
of social visibility/distinction and particularity were introduced, the rate of PSG 
recognition slowed dramatically. Eventually, the only two PSGs recognized after 
the BIA added new elements to the definition were overruled by Trump admin-
istration attorneys general. Put another way, since adding additional criteria to the 
 
117. This is particularly true because petitioners bear the burden of proof in an asylum case, 
which is heard in an adversarial system. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2020) (“The burden of proof is on 
the applicant for asylum to establish that he or she is a refugee as defined in section 101(a)(42) of 
the Act.”). 
118. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014). 
119. See Joline Doedens, The Politics of Domestic Violence-Based Asylum Claims, 22 DUKE 
J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 111, 125 (2014) (describing the “fact-intensive” process involved in demon-
strating asylum based on intimate partner violence, a claim almost certain to be based on membership 
in a particular social group); Sarah R. Goodman, Asking for Too Much? The Role of Corroborating 
Evidence in Asylum Proceedings in the United States and United Kingdom, 36 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1733, 1739–42 (2013) (concluding that evidentiary requirements are unrealistic when consider-
ing the situation of refugees). 
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Acosta definition, no particular social groups have survived BIA and DOJ scru-
tiny.120  
A. Particular Social Groups Recognized Under the Acosta Immutability Test 
Although it denied the proposed PSGs in Matter of Acosta, the Board of Im-
migration Appeals soon thereafter issued a series of precedent decisions recogniz-
ing several new particular social groups based on its newly created PSG test.121 
In Matter of Fuentes, the Board found that former members of the national police 
of El Salvador were a valid PSG.122 A few years later, in the landmark case Matter 
of Toboso-Alfonso, the Board recognized persecution based on sexual orientation 
as a basis for asylum.123  
In Matter of H-, the Board held that “members of the Marehan subclan of 
Somalia who share ties of kinship and linguistic commonalities” constitute a par-
ticular social group.124 In reaching its conclusion, the Board reasoned that “clan 
membership is a highly recognizable, immutable characteristic that is acquired at 
birth and is inextricably linked to family ties.”125  
 
120. As of March 2021. Some examples of particular social groups the Board rejected after 
imposition of the particularity and visibility/distinction criteria include “secularized and westernized 
Pakistanis perceived to be affiliated with the United States,” Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 91 (1st 
Cir. 2010); “Guatemalan citizens who [do] not sport gang colors and tattoos,” Paiz-Morales v. 
Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 240 (1st Cir. 2015); “women with children whose husbands live and work in 
the U.S. and it is known to society as a whole that the husbands live in the U.S.,” Granada-Rubio v. 
Lynch, 814 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2016); “young Albanian women between the ages of 15 and 25,” 
Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 193 (2d Cir. 2014); “individuals with bipolar disorder who exhibit 
erratic behavior,” Temu v. Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 890 (4th Cir. 2014); “active and long-term former 
gang members,” Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2015); “truckers who, be-
cause of their anti-FARC views and actions, have collaborated with law enforcement and refused to 
cooperate with FARC,” Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2011); “effective honest 
police,” R.R.D. v. Holder, 746 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 2014); “family business owners” in Guate-
mala, Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2008); “Mungiki defectors,” Gathungu 
v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2013); “escapee Mexican child laborers,” Gonzalez Cano v. 
Lynch, 809 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 2016); “Guatemalan repatriates who have lived and worked in 
the United States for many years and are perceived to be wealthy,” Cinto-Velasquez v. Lynch, 817 
F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2016); and “imputed wealthy Americans,” Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 
F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016). 
121. Only a small number of cases are designated as precedent by the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(g)(3) (2020) (“By majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of 
the Board rendered by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to serve as 
precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.”). Similarly, “[t]he vast majority of 
the Board’s decisions are unpublished.” DEP’T OF JUST., BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE 
MANUAL 8 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1101411/download [https://perma.cc
/AZ3E-E8Z9]. 
122. 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988). 
123. 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990), adopted as precedent in all future proceedings, 
Att’y Gen. Order No. 1895-94 (June 19, 1994). 
124. 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 337 (B.I.A. 1996). 
125. Id. at 342. 
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Later that same year, the Board issued a decision in Matter of Kasinga, rec-
ognizing the particular social group of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu 
tribe of Northern Togo who did not undergo “female genital mutilation, as prac-
ticed by that tribe, and who opposed the practice.”126 Although the wordy PSG 
appears on its face to be limited, and the specific facts of the case centered around 
the practice of female genital mutilation/cutting, the case was groundbreaking in 
its recognition of gender as a basis for asylum. Finally, in Matter of V-T-S-, the 
Board found that Filipinos of “mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry”—a group that 
could arguably also fall under the nationality ground—are a viable particular so-
cial group.127 
B. Particular Social Groups After the Addition of the Social Distinction and 
Particularity Requirements 
In contrast to the relatively generous acceptance of particular social groups in 
the decade after the Acosta decision, in the 14 years since the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals began instituting additional requirements for PSGs, it has only rec-
ognized two new groups—one providing protection to survivors of intimate part-
ner violence and the other relating to family membership. Both have since been 
overruled by Trump administration attorneys general.  
1. Claims Based on Intimate Partner Violence 
After Matter of Kasinga opened the door for the United States’ acceptance of 
gender-based asylum claims, the path to recognition of domestic violence as a 
ground for asylum was a long and winding one. The first significant intimate part-
ner violence case to be adjudicated by the immigration court system was Matter 
of R-A-.128 Ms. R-A- (whose full name is Rodi Alvarado) endured horrific vio-
lence at the hands of her husband, a former soldier in the Guatemalan army, from 
the time she married him at age sixteen.129 In the face of increasing and near-
deadly abuse, Ms. Alvarado fled to the United States and sought asylum.130 
A 14-year legal battle ensued. After the government appealed her original 
asylum grant by the immigration judge, the BIA concluded that “Guatemalan 
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, 
who believe that women are to live under male domination,” did not constitute a 
 
126. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 
127. 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (B.I.A. 1997). 
128. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att’y Gen. 2001), 
remanded, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (Att’y Gen. 2005), stay lifted, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (Att’y Gen. 2008). 
129. Id. at 909. 
130. Id. 
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PSG.131 Two attorneys general intervened in the case,132 and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)133 ultimately reversed its position, supporting a grant 
of asylum for Ms. Alvarado based on the PSG “married women in Guatemala who 
are unable to leave the relationship.”134 The brief filed by DHS in support of Ms. 
Alvarado marked the first time that this “unable to leave” social group formula-
tion, one that would become entrenched in domestic violence asylum claims in 
years to come, was officially posited. Several years, remands, and attorneys gen-
eral later, an immigration judge in San Francisco granted Ms. Alvarado asylum.135 
Because the grant of asylum in Matter of R-A- was at the immigration judge, 
or trial court, level, the lack of precedent meant that another domestic violence 
asylum case was soon ripe for consideration. In Matter of L-R-, DHS originally 
defended the IJ’s denial of Ms. L-R-’s claim before the BIA, but as the case pro-
gressed, the agency came to support Ms. L-R-’s request for asylum.136 In a brief 
to the BIA, DHS posited two alternative groups that Ms. L-R-, and supporters of 
intimate partner violence more generally, could advance—“Mexican women in 
domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican women who are 
viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship”—
and explained how each met the immutability, visibility, and particularity require-
ments.137 
After the parties filed supplemental briefings with BIA, DHS requested re-
mand of Matter of L-R- to the immigration judge.138 DHS stipulated that Ms. L-R- 
was eligible for asylum, and in August of 2010, she was granted asylum in a 
 
131. Id. at 917. 
132. Because the Board of Immigration Appeals is an administrative court housed within the 
Department of Justice, the Attorney General has the authority to intervene in any case before the 
BIA and issue decisions on that matter. See infra note 219. 
133. Attorneys from the Department of Homeland Security—specifically, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement’s Office of the Principal Legal Advisor—represent the interests of the U.S. 
government in immigration proceedings. See DHS, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor—Over-
view, https://www.ice.gov/opla [https://perma.cc/9QQX-66K5] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020). 
134. Department of Homeland Security’s Position on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 
15, Matter of Alvarado-Pena, No. A 73 753 922 (Att’y Gen. Feb. 19, 2004), https://cgrs.uchas-
tings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A-%20DHS%20brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY89-
XZKC]. 
135. Matter of Alvarado-Pena, [redacted] (Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev. Dec. 10, 2009) (on file 
with author). The immigration judge’s decision was brief, reading simply, “Inasmuch as there is no 
binding authority on the legal issues raised in this case, I conclude that I can conscientiously accept 
what is essentially the agreement of the parties [to grant asylum].” Id. 
136. Supplemental Brief for Department of Homeland Security, Matter of L-R-, [redacted] 
(B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4
_13_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ND5-CF9H]. 
137. Id. at 14–19. 
138. Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work
/matter-l-r [https://perma.cc/R6QU-J58T] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020). 
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summary order, once again, a procedural history that left future survivors and do-
mestic violence advocates without binding precedent upon which to rely.139 
After decades of uncertainty and ambiguity during both the pendency and af-
ter the resolution of Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R-, the BIA issued a precedent 
decision addressing the eligibility of survivors of domestic violence for asylum in 
August of 2014. In Matter of A-R-C-G- the Board considered the case of a woman 
from Guatemala, who, like Ms. Alvarado and Ms. L-R-, was subjected to brutal 
abuse by her intimate partner.140 The BIA found, and DHS conceded, that the 
abuse Ms. A-R-C-G- suffered was on account of her membership in the particular 
social group of “married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their rela-
tionship.”141 Matter of A-R-C-G- was hailed as a landmark case, one which, after 
decades of advocacy and litigation, finally established precedent for the right to 
asylum for survivors of intimate partner violence.142 
 
139. Much like the final order in Matter of R-A-, this decision is also extremely brief. The 
order simply states that asylum is granted, with a notation that the grant was a result of “stipulation 
of the parties.” Id. (quoting the summary order). 
140. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389–90 (B.I.A. 2014). 
141. Id. at 388–90. 
142. Julia Preston, In First for Court, Woman is Ruled Eligible for Asylum in U.S. on Basis of 
Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/us/victim-of-
domestic-violence-in-guatemala-is-ruled-eligible-for-asylum-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/3WJJ-
BKVR]; Tatyana Delgado, Landmark Asylum Decision for Domestic Violence Victims, CATH. LEGAL 
IMMIGR. NETWORK, https://cliniclegal.org/resources/articles-clinic/landmark-asylum-decision-do-
mestic-violence-victims [https://perma.cc/9633-AEG7?type=image] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020); 
Amy Grenier, Landmark Decision on Asylum Claims Recognizes Domestic Violence Victims, 
IMMIGR. IMPACT (Sept. 2, 2014), http://immigrationimpact.com/2014/09/02/landmark-decision-on-
asylum-claims-recognizes-domestic-violence-victims/#.XV1hyy3MyfU [https://perma.cc/6T52-TC
QW]. 
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The relative certainty143 provided by Matter of A-R-C-G- was, however, 
short-lived. In March 2018, then-AG Jeff Sessions referred to himself144 a domes-
tic violence asylum case, Matter of A-B-, with the stated goal of seeking to answer 
the question of “whether, and under what circumstances, being a victim of private 
criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ for purposes of 
an application for asylum or withholding of removal.”145 Three months later, Ses-
sions used Matter of A-B- to overrule Matter of A-R-C-G- and generally cast doubt 
on the viability of asylum claims based on intimate partner violence.146 
In his opinion, Sessions makes the sweeping assertion that claims “pertaining 
to domestic violence . . . perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify 
for asylum.”147 His decision is based in part on his view that “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” lack social distinction as a 
particular social group because “there is significant room for doubt that Guatema-
lan society views these women, as horrible as their personal circumstances may 
be, as members of a distinct group in society, rather than each as a victim of a 
particular abuser in highly individualized circumstances.”148 
A full exploration of Matter of A-B- is outside the scope of this Article, but 
scholars and others have critiqued Sessions’ antiquated views of intimate partner 
violence as a “private matter;” the excessive dicta throughout the opinion; his un-
derstanding of nexus, or the requirement that persecution be inflicted “on account 
 
143. Despite the significance of the precedent decision in A-R-C-G-, it was not a panacea. 
Even after the decision, “arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes . . . continued to characterize asylum 
adjudication in this area of the law.” Blaine Bookey, Gender-Based Asylum Post-Matter of 
A-R-C-G-: Evolving Standards and Fair Application of the Law, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2016). 
144. As discussed above, supra note 132, Attorneys General, as head of the Department of 
Justice, which houses the Board of Immigration Appeals, have broad power to refer cases to them-
selves. See also infra note 219. However, the manner in which Matter of A-B- reached Sessions’ 
desk is a matter of some controversy. The case was originally heard by an immigration judge, who 
denied Ms. A-B-’s claim. On appeal, the BIA reversed and remanded the case to the IJ for approval. 
However, the IJ did not do as instructed, instead attempting to recertify the case to the Board. At 
some point thereafter, the Attorney General learned of the decision (through unknown means) and 
certified the case to himself. See NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY: 
APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- 7–8, https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default
/files/content-type/resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B-%20Practice%20Advisory
%20-%20Final%20-%206.21.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/333L-BMJM] (last visited Aug. 26, 2020). 
The immigration judge, V. Stuart Couch, who presided over the original trial, denied the claims of 
93.2% of applicants who appeared before his court, one of the highest denial rates in the country. 
Judge V. Stuart Couch, TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports
/00394CHL/index.html [https://perma.cc/P3QC-NCCY] (last visited Sept. 11, 2020). After his ac-
tions relating to Matter of A-B-, IJ Couch was appointed by AG Barr to serve on the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals. See Executive Office for Immigration Review Swears in Six New Board Members, 
DOJ EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1197631
/download [https://perma.cc/K2EX-7GGE]. 
145. 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 227 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
146. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
147. Id. at 320. 
148. Id. at 336. 
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of” or “in order to overcome” a protected characteristic; and his creation of a 
heightened, and ultra vires, standard for claims of persecution at the hands of non-
state actors.149 Despite these critiques, Matter of A-B- is now the precedent case 
on intimate partner violence and asylum and the PSG recognized by Matter of A-
R-C-G- has been abrogated. Although asylum claims are still adjudicated on a 
case-by-case basis150 and survivors of domestic violence continue to have a path 
to lawful immigration status by positing PSGs that are immutable, socially dis-
tinct, and particular, the lack of precedent poses serious challenges.151 Moreover, 
the reasoning utilized by then-Attorney General Sessions in Matter of A-B- was 
soon cited and echoed by Attorney General Barr to overrule the only other post-
Acosta particular social group. 
2. Claims Based on Family Membership 
A particular social group based on family membership has an unparalleled 
foundation in the BIA’s jurisprudence. Matter of Acosta listed “kinship ties” as 
one of the prototypical characteristics of an immutable particular social group,152 
and in Matter of H-, the Board, citing the link between clan and family ties, rec-
ognized clan membership as the basis for a PSG.153 In 2017, the Board decided 
Matter of L-E-A-, which explicitly recognized a particular social group based on 
immediate family.154 
 
149. See, e.g., Natalie Nanasi, Commentary: Matter of A-B-, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: 
REWRITTEN FAMILY LAW OPINIONS 360 (Rachel Rebouche ed., 2020); Theresa A. Vogel, Critiquing 
Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain Future in Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner 
Violence, 52 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 343, 373–406 (2019). Additionally, and significantly, eleven of 
twelve amici and the Department of Homeland Security itself argued in briefings that A-R-C-G- 
should not be vacated as it constituted a valid application of law. See Jeffrey S. Chase, The Immi-
gration Court: Issues and Solutions, https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2019/3/28/i6el1do6l5
p443u1nkf8vwr28dv9qi [https://perma.cc/9C7G-QWHR] (last visited Aug. 27, 2020). 
150. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“The particular kind of 
group characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-
case basis.”); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242, 251 (B.I.A. 2014) (noting that, since 
“social group determinations are made on a case-by-case basis,” its “holdings in Matter of S-E-G- 
and Matter of E-A-G- should not be read as a blanket rejection of all factual scenarios involving 
gangs”). 
151. Although significant legal hurdles remain for those seeking asylum based on intimate 
partner violence, a number of federal courts have questioned the analysis in Matter of A-B- and 
rejected Sessions’ categorial rule precluding asylum based on domestic abuse. See, e.g., De Pena-
Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 89 (1st Cir. 2020); Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 785 (6th Cir. 
2020); Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2018). 
152. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
153. Matter of H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342 (B.I.A. 1996). Family as a particular social group 
also has a strong basis in international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
states that “the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protec-
tion by society and the State.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 23(1), Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force in the United States Sept. 8, 1992); Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at art. 16(3), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 74 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
154. 27 I. & N. Dec 40, 42 (B.I.A. 2017). 
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The applicant in Matter of L-E-A- was the son of a Mexican grocer who re-
fused to allow La Familia Michoacana, a criminal cartel, to sell drugs in his store. 
A week after Mr. L-E-A- also rejected a similar demand, the cartel attempted to 
kidnap him, leading him to flee to the United States.155 In analyzing Mr. L-E-A-’s 
claim, the BIA, echoing the language of social distinction, first stated that “a claim 
based on family membership will depend on the nature and degree of the relation-
ships involved and how those relationships are regarded by the society in ques-
tion.”156 It then concluded that in the instant case, it had “no difficulty identifying 
the respondent, a son residing in his father’s home, as being a member of the par-
ticular social group comprised of his father’s immediate family.”157 
Recognizing a PSG, however, is only one step in the asylum analysis. Appli-
cants must also demonstrate that the persecution they suffered or fear is “on ac-
count of” their membership in that PSG, also known as the “nexus” require-
ment.158 In its discussion of nexus in Matter of L-E-A-, the Board stated that “the 
fact that a persecutor targets a family member simply as a means to an end is not, 
by itself, sufficient to establish a claim, especially if the end is not connected to 
another protected ground.”159 It then concluded that Mr. L-E-A- did not meet this 
new and heightened nexus standard because he “did not establish that his mem-
bership in a particular social group comprised of his father’s family members was 
at least one central reason for the events he experienced and the harm he claims to 
fear in the future.”160 In reaching this decision, the Board appeared to create a 
separate requirement, a so-called “double nexus” requirement,161 applicable only 
to family-based particular social groups—that an applicant must suffer persecu-
tion on account of a second protected ground in order to merit asylum protection.  
Analyzing nexus in this way would mean that a family-based PSG is subject 
to requirements that other groups—and other grounds—are not. This is, of course, 
contrary to the statute, which makes no such distinction. Moreover, as federal 
courts have unequivocally stated, “the law in this circuit and others is clear that a 
family may be a particular social group simply by virtue of its kinship ties, without 
requiring anything more.”162  
 
155. See id. at 41. 
156. Id. at 43. 
157. Id. 
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). 
159. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 45. 
160. Id. at 47. In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which requires applicants for 
asylum to prove that a protected ground is “at least one central reason” for the fear of persecution. 
REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 303 (2005). Accord Matter of 
J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2007) (applying the “at least one central reason” lan-
guage). 
161. See Fatma Marouf, Becoming Unconventional: Constricting the ‘Particular Social 
Group’ Ground for Asylum, 44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 487, 509 (2019). 
162. Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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Concerns about nexus did not have much time to manifest in future cases, 
however, because in December 2018, Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker 
(who served in his position for a little over three months) referred Matter of L-E-A- 
to himself.163 The question posed in Whitaker’s order was “[w]hether, and under 
what circumstances, an alien may establish persecution on account of membership 
in a ‘particular social group’ . . . based on the alien’s membership in a family 
unit.”164  
In July 2019, Attorney General William Barr issued a decision that overruled 
the part of Matter of L-E-A- that recognized family membership as a basis for a 
particular social group.165 Barr’s order asserts that most families likely cannot 
constitute a valid PSG because they are not sufficiently socially distinct.166 Ac-
cording to the Attorney General, only families with “greater meaning in society” 
or with “societal importance” satisfy the element of social distinction.167 “The 
average family,” he argues, would be “unlikely” to satisfy meet his new PSG cri-
teria.168  
Barr’s order also asserts that since “almost every alien is a member of a family 
of some kind, categorically recognizing families as particular social groups would 
render virtually every alien a member of a particular social group.”169 This state-
ment echoes the reasoning of those who fear that a broad PSG definition would 
open the floodgates of asylum seekers. The flaw in Barr’s argument becomes read-
ily apparent by substituting the word “family” with “race” or “national origin.”170 
In doing so, one can easily see that broad membership in an asylum ground should 
not disqualify it from serving as a basis for protection under existing law.  
The Attorney General’s opinion in Matter of L-E-A- also claims that if “Con-
gress intended for refugee status to turn on one’s suffering of persecution ‘on ac-
count of’ family membership, Congress would have included family identity as 
one of the expressly enumerated covered grounds for persecution.”171 This too is 
a disingenuous argument and an unsound reason for rejecting an otherwise valid 
PSG. Particular social group has long been “understood to constitute a dynamic 
category, open to future developments.”172 Countless categories of individuals 
 
163. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 494. 
164. Id. 
165. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 596–97 (Att’y Gen. 2019). 
166. Id. at 582 (citing Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (B.I.A. 2014)) (“[W]hat 
qualifies certain clans or kinship groups as particular social groups is not merely the genetic ties 
among the members. Rather, it is that those ties or other salient factors establish the kinship group, 
on its own terms, as a ‘recognized component of the society in question.’”). 
167. Id. at 594. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 593. 
170. Every person has a race or a national origin, yet asylum law explicitly recognizes those 
expansive categories as bases of protection. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018). 
171. Id. 
172. THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL: 
A COMMENTARY 391 (Andreas Zimmerman, ed. 2011). 
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were not explicitly mentioned in the refugee definition, but the statute has long 
been interpreted in a way that protects unenumerated groups that fall under the 
broad categories of the other asylum grounds (especially particular social 
group).173  
Barr’s order addresses, but ultimately dismisses, the firmly established legal 
precedent recognizing families as viable PSGs.174 Since Acosta, family has been 
described as the “quintessential particular social group”175 and courts have de-
clared that “the family provides a prototypical example of a ‘particular social 
group.’”176 Many federal circuit courts agree with the Seventh Circuit’s assess-
ment that “case law has suggested, with some certainty, that a family constitutes 
a cognizable ‘particular social group.’”177 Barr’s decision in Matter of L-E-A- was 
thus a drastic break with not only sound precedent but the reasoned analysis of 
nearly every court or jurist who has considered the issue.  
It is important to note that Matter of A-B- and Matter of L-E-A- do not elimi-
nate domestic violence or family-based asylum. When stripped of dicta, Sessions’ 
 
173. In fact, when the House of Representatives debated the 1980 Refugee Act, Representa-
tive Elizabeth Holtzman noted that the Act “does not specifically refer to any particular group, be-
cause this is legislation not for today or next year, but for many years to come.” 125 CONG. REC. 
35,813 (1979). 
174. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 589 (“I recognize that a number of courts of appeals 
have issued opinions that recognize a family-based social group as a ‘particular social group’ under 
the asylum statute. . . . I also recognize that certain courts of appeals have conserved the requisite 
elements of a ‘particular social group’ and, despite the requirements set forth in M-E-V-G- and 
W-G-R-, have nonetheless suggested that shared family ties alone are sufficient to satisfy the INA’s 
definition of ‘refugee.’”). 
175. Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015). 
176. Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing family 
members of “those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to be prosecutorial wit-
nesses” as a PSG). The court further opined: “[W]e can conceive of few groups more readily identi-
fiable than the family.” Id. See also Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that a group of family members was a “prototypical example” of a PSG). 
177. Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that “other circuits have found 
that family is perhaps the most easily identifiable ‘particular social group’ that could serve as the 
basis for persecution”). See also Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, 
in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common identifiable and immutable char-
acteristics than that of the nuclear family.”); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 150, 154–55 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“The Board has unambiguously held that membership in a nuclear family may substantiate a social-
group basis of persecution.”); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238–40 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting that 
“kinship ties” qualify as a particular social group); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (“We join our sister circuits in holding that ‘family’ constitutes a ‘particular social 
group.’”); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The first characteristic of 
their proffered social group—membership in the same family—is widely recognized by the 
caselaw.”). 
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and Barr’s178 opinions rest only on their objection to the BIA accepting too many 
stipulations from the parties, which led them to conclude that the court’s analysis 
“lacked rigor and broke with [its] own precedents.”179 Eligibility for asylum is 
still, as it has always been, determined on a case-by-case basis,180 which means 
that judges remain free to recognize particular social groups based on intimate 
partner violence and family membership even in the absence of BIA precedent. 
However, with precedent-setting cases overruled, future decisions will lack pre-
dictability, uniformity, and consistency.181  
The volatility of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ jurisprudence—the 
changing PSG definition and the inconsistency of its application—led to the inter-
vention of the federal courts. A discussion of federal circuit courts of appeals’ 
particular social group jurisprudence follows. 
IV. 
APPLICATION BY FEDERAL COURTS 
Although the Board of Immigration Appeals is the highest administrative 
body to interpret U.S. immigration laws, appeals of its decisions can be made to 
 
178. Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 596 (“[T]he Board’s particular social group analysis 
merely cited past Board and federal court precedents recognizing family-based groups and then 
agreed with the parties’ stipulations. The Board summarily concluded that ‘the facts of this case 
present a valid particular social group,’ without explaining how the facts supported this finding or 
satisfied the particularity and social visibility requirements. This cursory treatment could not, and 
did not, satisfy the Board’s duty to ensure that the respondent satisfied the statutory requirements to 
qualify for asylum.”). Barr’s arguments and concerns relating to stipulations are surprising, because 
the family-based particular social group was firmly settled precedent, so such stipulations were rou-
tine and even expected. In fact, the rare consensus between immigration advocates and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security could arguably indicate the strength of the domestic violence and family-
based particular social groups. The attacks are also disingenuous because the Trump administration 
argued it sought to make the system “more efficient” when it imposed quotas on immigration judges. 
Tal Kopan, Justice Department Rolls Out Case Quotas for Immigration Judges, CNN POLITICS (Apr. 
2, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/02/politics/immigration-judges-quota/index.html [https://
perma.cc/JBR5-PNAT]. Were that truly the case, it seems illogical for Sessions and Barr to ignore 
the role of stipulations in increasing judicial efficiency. 
179. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 333 (A.G. 2018). 
180. See supra note 150. 
181. According to studies conducted by Professors Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew 
Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag, the asylum adjudicatory system is already beset with rampant in-
consistency. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz & Philip Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Dis-
parities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 389 (2007). The authors describe “remarka-
ble variation in decisions . . . even during periods when there has been no intervening change in the 
law” based on non-substantive factors such as the national origin or current geographic location of 
the applicant or the attitude and identity of the adjudicator. Id. at 302. See generally PHILLIP G. 
SCHRAG, ANDREW SCHOENHOLTZ & JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES, LIVES IN THE BALANCE: ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2014). 
5_NANASI_45.2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/6/2021  12:12 PM 
2021] DEATH OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 289 
the federal court of appeals. A federal court’s decision is binding on the BIA when 
it considers cases arising in that circuit.182  
Every federal court of appeals in the United States has considered the Board’s 
post-Acosta criteria. Many courts have accepted the social distinction and partic-
ularity tests,183 but several others have rejected the imposition of these additional 
requirements. This section will review the decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to highlight the varied approaches taken by federal courts.  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected outright the social visibil-
ity and particularity requirements. In Gatimi v. Holder, the court found that social 
visibility was inconsistent with past decisions, and thus not entitled to Chevron 
deference.184 The principle of deference under Chevron v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council will be discussed in detail in Section V.C. below, but in brief, it is a 
doctrine that requires courts to defer to an agency’s (in this case, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’) reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.185  
Judge Posner, who authored the Gatimi opinion, concluded that the Board’s 
formula “makes no sense” and that the BIA had not “attempted, in this or any other 
case, to explain the reasoning behind the criterion of social visibility.”186 In hold-
ing that the Board’s interpretation of particular social group was unreasonable, the 
court highlighted concerns about the BIA’s lack of uniformity in decision-making, 
stating that when “an administrative agency’s decisions are inconsistent, a court 
cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines and defer to that one . . . [s]uch picking 
 
182. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A federal agency is obligated 
to follow circuit precedent in cases originating within that circuit.”) (citing NLRB v. Ashkenazy 
Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991)). 
183. See Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that social visi-
bility is not a departure from the Acosta standard, but rather an “elaboration of how the immutable 
characteristic requirement operates”); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(finding the social visibility requirement “consistent with this Court’s reasoning that a ‘particular 
social group is comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common 
which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the outside world in 
general’”) (quoting Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991)); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 
440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing both social distinction and particularity as criteria for a valid 
particular social group); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding 
additional PSG requirements as “a subtle shift that evolved out of the BIA’s prior decisions on sim-
ilar cases”); Umama-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 669 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding social distinc-
tion and particularity criteria); Costanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
“a social group requires sufficient particularity and visibility such that the group is perceived as a 
cohesive group by society”); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1230–35 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding and elaborating on the definitions of particularity and social visibility); Pinzon Pulido v. 
U.S. Att’y Gen., 427 F. App’x 729, 730 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[i]n assessing whether the 
alien’s alleged group constitutes a particular social group, we consider the group’s immutability and 
social visibility”). 
184. 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009). 
185. See 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
186. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615. 
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and choosing would condone arbitrariness and usurp the agency’s responsibili-
ties.”187 
The Gatimi decision was issued before the Board redefined social visibility 
as social distinction, and the court devoted significant attention to the illogical 
nature of the visibility requirement. It noted the obvious—that those at risk of 
persecution will often hide, and that “to the extent that the members of the target 
group are successful in remaining invisible, they will not be ‘seen’ by other people 
in the society as ‘a segment of the population.’”188  
Even after the Board subsequently clarified that ocular visibility was not re-
quired and renamed social visibility as social distinction, the Seventh Circuit did 
not reverse its position. In the 2018 case W.G.A. v. Sessions, the court noted that 
“[w]hether the Board’s particularity and social distinction requirements are enti-
tled to Chevron deference remains an open question in this circuit.”189 The court 
also validated concerns that “social distinction and particularity create a concep-
tual trap that is difficult, if not impossible, to navigate” because “[t]he applicant 
must identify a group that is broad enough that the society as a whole recognizes 
it, but not so broad that it fails particularity.”190  
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals initially rejected 
the BIA’s imposition of the visibility and particularity requirements. However, in 
2018, the Third Circuit reversed its position and now accepts the Board’s formu-
lation.191  
The Third Circuit’s initial precedent arose in the case of Valdiviezo-Galdamez 
v. United States Attorney General, in which it considered the particular social 
group of “Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but have 
refused to join because they oppose the gangs.”192 The court concluded that be-
cause the BIA had departed from Acosta without a principled explanation, the vis-
ibility and particularity requirements were not entitled to Chevron deference.193 
The court based its decision on its view that the Board’s actions were both incon-
sistent and irrational.194 Understanding social visibility to impermissibly mandate 
on-sight visibility, the court determined that the new requirement was “incon-
sistent with past BIA decisions . . . [and therefore] an unreasonable addition” to 
 
187. Id. at 616. 
188. Id. at 615. 
189. 900 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2018). See also Orellana-Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 
484 (7th Cir. 2017) (reviewing the Board’s factual determinations for substantial evidentiary support 
and its legal conclusions de novo). 
190. W.G.A., 900 F.3d. at 965 n.4. 
191. See S.E.R.L. v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 547 (3d Cir. 2018). 
192. 663 F.3d 582, 617 (3d Cir. 2011). 
193. Id. at 608–9. 
194. Id. at 604 (“Although we afforded the BIA’s interpretation of ‘particular social 
group’ Chevron deference in Fatin, this did not give the agency license to thereafter adjudicate 
claims of social group status inconsistently, or irrationally.”). 
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the PSG requirements.195 The court also took issue with social visibility’s incon-
sistent application, finding that the Board sometimes described visibility as recog-
nizability by others in society but at other times in reference to internal character-
istics, such as sexual orientation, that are invisible absent self-disclosure.196 
Finally, irreconcilability lay at the root of the Valdiviezo-Galdamez court’s 
explicit rejection of the particularity requirement. As it stated, social visibility and 
particularity “appear to be different articulations of the same concept” with the 
latter being “little more than a reworked definition [of the former].”197 Thus, be-
cause it was “hard-pressed to discern any difference between the requirement of 
‘particularity’ and the discredited requirement of ‘social visibility,’” the Third Cir-
cuit declined to support the Board’s definition of particular social group.198 
However, after the BIA’s decisions in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of 
W-G-R- reclassified social visibility as social distinction, the Third Circuit re-
versed course. In S.E.R.L. v. United States Attorney General, the court stated that 
the BIA had responded to the concerns expressed in Valdiviezo-Galdamez by 
providing a “‘principled reason’ and explanation” for the new requirements and 
distinguishing between particularity and visibility/distinction.199 As such, the ap-
peals court found that the BIA’s new “statutory interpretation is entitled to Chev-
ron deference.”200 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals takes a wholly different approach. 
In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, the court stated that a particular social group “implies 
a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some 
common impulse or interest.”201 The court further explained that “[o]f central con-
cern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported 
members, which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their 
identity as a member of that discrete social group.”202 Later, in Hernandez-Mon-
tiel v. INS, the court clarified that this “voluntary associational relationship” test 
is an alternative to the Acosta immutability definition.203  
After Hernandez-Montiel, the court further elaborated on its PSG standard by 
addressing the BIA’s jurisprudence. In Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that social visibility was a “refinement” of Acosta and required 
 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 603–04. 
197. Id. at 608. 
198. Id. 
199. 894 F.3d 535, 547 (3d Cir. 2018). 
200. Id. at 540. Despite its acceptance of the BIA’s PSG definition, the court also acknowl-
edged “arguable inconsistencies in the [BIA’s] precedent” that pose a risk of the requirements being 
“applied arbitrarily and interpreted to impose an unreasonably high evidentiary burden.” Id. at 550. 
201. 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986). 
202. Id. 
203. 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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“perception” as opposed to on-sight visibility.204 As such, because the visibility 
(and particularity) requirements could be applied in such a way as to avoid direct 
conflict with prior precedent, the court did not reject outright the new criteria as 
unreasonable under its Chevron analysis.205 However, the court left the matter 
unresolved, concluding that it “need not decide, in this case, at this time, whether 
[it] should align [itself] with the Third and Seventh Circuits and invalidate these 
requirements.”206  
In sum, federal courts have had varied responses to the BIA’s imposition of 
the social visibility/distinction and particularity requirements on top of Acosta’s 
immutability test. Some courts have accepted the new requirements, some have 
rejected them entirely, and others have adopted different standards and definitions. 
What remains is a circuit split and continuing critiques of the BIA’s PSG jurispru-
dence, particularly in light of the Trump administration’s elimination of the only 
two particular social groups recognized by the BIA after new criteria were intro-
duced in 2006. The next Section proposes recommendations that could resuscitate 
the now-dead PSG ground.  
V. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The stated goal of the 1980 Refugee Act was “to provide a permanent and 
systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special hu-
manitarian concern to the United States.”207 The Act’s language suggests a desire 
for consistency and fairness in the adjudication of claims for asylum, regardless 
of shifting political winds.  
Notably, nearly all of the cases that imposed extra conditions on the particular 
social group definition accepted by the international community and originally 
adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals involved applicants facing perse-
cution at the hands of Central American gangs. As Professor Susan Bibler Courtin 
has noted, the United States government has long treated Central Americans “as 
generally undeserving of political asylum,” regardless of the legal merits of their 
 
204. 707 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The court stated: “‘[O]n-sight’ visibility 
would be inconsistent with previous BIA decisions and likely impermissible under the statute. How-
ever, we do not read C-A- and subsequent cases to require ‘on-sight’ visibility.” Id. at 1087–88. 
205. Id. at 1089 (“So long as the ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ criteria area are applied 
in a way that did not directly conflict with prior agency precedent, we would be hard-pressed to 
reject the new criteria as unreasonable under Chevron.”). 
206. Id. at 1091. In Reyes v. Lynch, the court held that the BIA’s particularity and social dis-
tinction requirements were entitled to Chevron deference. See 842 F.3d 1125, 1133–37 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
207. Refugee Act of 1980 § 101(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
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claims.208 This politicization of asylum was exacerbated in the Trump era, as 
“[r]efugees of the Northern Triangle . . . face[d], in many courts, something of a 
Sisyphean struggle to obtain asylum with denial rates for these cases remaining 
far higher than for other countries.”209  
Discrimination and animus against asylum seekers from Central America are 
evident in PSG jurisprudence. As Professor Helen Grant has explained, “[i]n the 
twenty-first century, it is former gang members, youth vulnerable to recruitment 
by gangs . . . females subject to forced sexual relationships with gang members, 
and informants on drug cartels and organized crime that form a sample of the 
groups now seeking protection under the PSG ground.”210 These applicants do not 
look like the political dissidents and survivors of race and religious-based perse-
cution who were originally envisioned by the drafters of international and domes-
tic asylum law. They also evoke floodgates and modern domestic political con-
cerns. Yet although these asylum seekers face as serious and deadly risks as their 
forbearers, U.S. courts have methodically curtailed particular social group eligi-
bility to exclude them.211  
While the BIA systematically denied claims of asylum seekers fleeing gang 
violence in the 2000s, claims based on intimate partner violence and family mem-
bership were ultimately approved, perhaps because they seemed “safer” or more 
 
208. See Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American 
Asylum Seekers, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 570 (2011). Echoing the current Justice Department’s 
view of intimate partner violence as a personal matter, Professor Coutin explains that the change in 
law and policy regarding Central American asylum seekers resulted in part from the United States’ 
shifting view of “the character of violence” in the region “from overtly political to seemingly crim-
inal in nature.” Id. at 570. 
209. Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Reparations for Central American Refugees, 96 DENV. L. REV. 
585, 608 (2019). Professor Sherman-Stokes explains the rationale behind the low grant rates for 
Central American asylum seekers by noting that “[e]arly on, it was clear what law enforcement, 
Congress, political leaders, courts, and adjudicators thought of these Central Americans: that they 
were undeserving economic migrants whose admission would open the ‘floodgates’ for the world’s 
most poor and vulnerable to come pouring into the United States.” Id. at 593. 
210. See Grant, supra note 93, at 899. 
211. The dangerous conditions in the Northern Triangle have been well documented. See, e.g., 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF 
REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO (2015), https://www.un-
hcr.org/en-us/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html [https://perma.cc/B7XR-KRV3]; 
MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, Forced to Flee Central America’s Northern Triangle: A Neglected 
Humanitarian Crisis (May 2017), http://www.msf.org/sites/msf.org/files/msf_forced-to-flee-cen-
tral-americas-northern-triangle_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8XW-6YUK]; Ben Raderstorf, Carole J. 
Wilson, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister & Michael J. Camilleri, Beneath the Violence: How Insecurity 
Shapes Daily Life and Emigration in Central America: A Report of the Latin American Public Opin-
ion Project and the Inter-American Dialogue (The Dialogue, Working Paper, Oct. 2017), 
https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Crime-Avoidance-Report-FINAL-
ONLINE.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8PD-4UD8]. 
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politically palatable for the BIA and DOJ.212 But in an administration that was 
hostile to asylum seekers and attempted, in countless ways,213 to curtail rights of 
those who seek refuge in the United States, even these more sympathetic appli-
cants were denied.  
A review of PSG jurisprudence suggests that what truly underlies the actions 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Department of Justice is politics. As 
such, the way to depoliticize asylum, and return to the balanced and rights-protec-
tive system the drafters of both international and domestic law intended, is to leg-
islate a PSG definition, address the overuse of attorney general certification, and 
reconsider the application of the Chevron doctrine. This Section will address each 
in turn.  
A. Enact Legislation to Codify the Acosta Standard 
In imposing the social distinction and particularity requirements, the Board 
of Immigration Appeals has effectively stripped the particular social group ground 
of all efficacy. Thus, in order to restore the law’s intent, Congress should amend 
the refugee definition in the Immigration and Nationality Act and codify the 
Acosta immutability standard alone as the definition of particular social group. 
Alternatively, Congress could adopt a PSG definition modeled on the UNHCR 
Guidelines—one in which social distinction is an alternative, used only when a 
group does not possess the requisite immutability.214 In this way, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ desire for particular social groups to be perceived as such 
by society would be achieved without compromising protections for survivors. 
A return to the Acosta test would not constitute a dramatic shift in PSG juris-
prudence. Despite the BIA’s imposition of additional criteria between 2006 and 
2014, the 1980s-era Acosta immutability standard continues to be a core part of 
the particular social group definition.215 Requirements have been added, but 
Acosta remains, which suggests its strength and its critical place in PSG jurispru-
dence.  
Moreover, an Acosta-centered definition best comports with the intentions of 
the drafters of 1951 Refugee Convention (and the 1967 Protocol that incorporated 
the Convention by reference), international jurisprudence that has developed to 
 
212. See generally Diane Uchimiya, Falling Through the Cracks: Gang Victims as Casualties 
in Current Asylum Jurisprudence, 23 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 109 (2013); Lisa Frydman & Neha 
Desai, Beacon of Hope or Failure of Protection? U.S. Treatment of Asylum Claims Based on Perse-
cution by Organized Gangs, 12–10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (“The often cursory denials of asylum 
claims based on resistance to gangs seem to be largely a function of fear of floodgates, misunder-
standing of precedent, or ignorance of conditions on the ground.”). 
213. See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. 
214. UNHCR PSG Guidelines, supra note 40, at 4. 
215. See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (B.I.A. 1999) (“The starting point for ‘social 
group’ analysis remains the existence of an immutable or fundamental individual characteristic in 
accordance with Matter of Acosta.”). 
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implement it, and UNHCR guidance.216 And because, as described above, the goal 
of the 1980 Refugee Act was to align domestic law with the Convention and Pro-
tocol, a definition emphasizing immutable characteristics also respects the intent 
of Congress.  
Since 2009, Congress has advanced a number of bills defining “particular so-
cial group” as “any group whose members share a characteristic that is either im-
mutable or fundamental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of the person’s 
human rights such that the person should not be required to change it, shall be 
deemed a particular social group, without any additional requirement.”217 These 
bills containing Acosta-only language have not gained sufficient traction in the 
legislature, and in today’s divisive political climate, may be difficult to pass. As 
such, until such time as legislation is practicable, regulatory reform may provide 
an easier path.218  
B. Create Article I Immigration Courts to Address the Politicization of 
Immigration Adjudication 
As described above, the two particular social groups recognized after the BIA 
added social distinction and particularity requirements onto the Acosta test were 
both overruled by Trump-appointed attorneys general. A single individual has the 
power to overturn an appellate tribunal’s decision because immigration courts are 
administrative bodies located within the Department of Justice. As such, AGs have 
the authority to review, and overrule, decisions issued by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals.219  
 
216. See Marouf, supra note 44, at 54–57 (detailing the use of the Acosta standard in foreign 
courts). 
217. Refugee Protection Act of 2010, S. 3113, 111th Cong. (2010); Refugee Protection Act 
of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. (2011); Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Cong. 
(2011); Violence Against Immigrant Women Act of 2012, H.R. 5331, 112th Cong. (2012); Violence 
Against Immigrant Women Act of 2013, H.R. 629, 113th Cong. (2013); Refugee Protection Act of 
2013, S. 645, 113th Cong. (2013); Refugee Protection Act of 2013, H.R. 1365, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Refugee Protection Act of 2016, S. 3241, 114th Cong. (2016); Refugee Protection Act of 2016, H.R. 
5851, 114th Cong. (2016). 
218. See Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 
2512, 2539–44 (2014) (positing that regulatory reform would be easier and more effective than 
amending the INA). 
219. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(ii) (2020) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney General 
for review of its decision all cases that . . . [t]he Attorney General directs the Board to refer to 
him.”). For a detailed examination of the attorney general certification process, see Alberto R. Gon-
zales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy Through the Attorney Gen-
eral’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841 (2016). Responses to Gonzales and Glen’s article 
also provide thoughtful analysis of this broad power. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Improving the Ex-
ercise of the Attorney General’s Immigration Referral Power: Lessons from the Battle over the 
“Categorical Approach” to Classifying Crimes, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2016); Bijal Shah, The 
Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 129 (2017); Margaret 
H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Administration: Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Ap-
peals Decisions, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 18 (2016). 
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The power of case certification has been used with significantly increasing 
frequency in recent years. Trump’s attorneys general certified 16 cases to them-
selves, which is more than triple the number of cases certified in the Obama and 
Clinton administrations combined.220 Attorney General William Barr, who issued 
the opinion in Matter of L-E-A-, did not certify any cases to himself when he was 
the AG from 1991–1993 in the George H. W. Bush administration.221 
In 2018, the Department of Justice took steps to further expand the circum-
stances in which attorneys general can refer cases to themselves for review. A 
proposed rule would give the AG power to hear cases pending before (as opposed 
to decided by) the BIA, as well as certain decisions by immigration judges that 
have not been appealed to the BIA.222  
The attorney general’s certification authority allows the politically appointed 
head of an executive department to singlehandedly override the opinions of 
judges. This is not, however, the only example of partisan interference in the im-
migration courts. For example, in 2002, former Attorney General John Ashcroft 
cut the BIA’s membership “by more than half, removing four of the five members 
who ruled in favor of noncitizens at the highest rates.”223 In a strikingly similar 
move, in June 2020, nine members of the 23-member Board were reassigned, 
which critics argued was a mechanism to dilute “the independence of an important 
appeals body by filling it with new hires more willing to carry out the Trump ad-
ministration’s restrictive immigration policies.”224 The executive branch also 
houses both the prosecutors and the judges in the immigration court system, 
 
220. Comprehensive List of AG-Certified Opinions in Trump Administration to Date, 
IMMIGRATIONPROFBLOG (Nov. 9, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2020/11
/comprehensive-list-of-ag-certified-opinions-in-trump-administration-to-date.html [https://perma
.cc/9VNF-4K2Y]. See also Lorelei Laird, Whose Court is this Anyway? Immigration Judges Accuse 
Executive Branch of Politicizing Their Courts, A.B.A. J., APRIL 2019, at 56, http://www.abajour-
nal.com/magazine/article/immigration-judges-executive-politicizing-courts [https://perma.cc/3X
CV-X4H6]. President Clinton’s Attorney General, Janet Reno, certified only one case to herself; 
President Obama’s Attorneys General, Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch, certified a combined four. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. OFF. OF INFO. & REGUL. AFFS., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 
RIN 1125-AA86, REFERRAL OF DECISIONS IN IMMIGRATION MATTERS TO THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL, (2018), https://reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201804&RIN=1125-
AA86 [https://perma.cc/22EB-8X3Z]. 
223. Amit Jain, Bureaucrats in Robes: Immigration “Judges” and the Trappings of “Courts,” 
33 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 261, 272 (2019). 
224. Tanvi Misra, DOJ ‘Reassigned’ Career Members of Board of Immigration Appeals, 
ROLL CALL (June 9, 2020, 4:55 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/06/09/DOJ-REASSIGNED-
CAREER-MEMBERS-OF-BOARD-OF-IMMIGRATION-APPEALS/ [https://perma.cc/DV6F-
GGH6]. 
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creating, at bare minimum, the appearance of conflict and collusion.225 Concerns 
about fairness in the immigration court system generally, and the asylum adjudi-
catory process more specifically, were exacerbated in the Trump era, when “the 
President, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . ap-
plied extraordinary pressure on IJs and [Asylum Officers] to deny both applica-
tions for asylum and requests for asylum hearings, with predictable results.”226 In 
these and many other ways, justice in immigration court is politicized and the in-
dependence of judges undermined. 
Establishing an immigration court system that is independent from the De-
partment of Justice could solve the problem of politicization of immigration jus-
tice. Many have called on Congress to establish the immigration courts as federal 
Article I courts, unaffiliated with the Department of Justice.227 Precedent exists 
for such a move, as other specialized courts, including the Court of Veteran’s Ap-
peals, the Court of Federal Claims, and the U.S. Tax Court, function as Article I 
courts.228 Such systems provide independence, transparency, and impartial justice 
for all who appear before them, characteristics now lacking in our nation’s immi-
gration courts.  
C. Reconsider Chevron Deference 
As discussed above in Section IV, the federal courts’ dominant jurisprudential 
lens for evaluating the BIA’s particular social group decision-making is whether 
the administrative court’s opinions should be entitled to deference under Chevron 
v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel. The Chevron doctrine states that courts 
should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.229 This 
 
225. AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, AILA Policy Brief: Restoring Integrity 
and Independence to America’s Immigration Courts (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.aila.org/File
/DownloadEmbeddedFile/77605 (noting “a conflict of interest built into the [U.S. immigration court] 
system itself” because “[t]he Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which manages the 
Immigration Court and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), is currently housed under DOJ. 
While trial-level immigration prosecutors are housed under the U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS) within Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Attorney General supervises 
the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) which defends immigration cases on behalf of the gov-
ernment in the circuit courts of appeals.”). 
226. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Due Process, Immigration Judges, and Immigration Officers, 
YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 24, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/due-process-im-
migration-judges-and-immigration-officers-by-richard-j-pierce-jr/ [https://perma.cc/JM9V-8P2C]. 
227. See, e.g., Letter from the American Bar Association, American Immigration Lawyers 
Association, Federal Bar Association, and National Association of Immigration Judges, Congress 
Should Establish an Independent Immigration Court (July 11, 2018) (on file with author) (arguing 
that “in its current state, the immigration court system requires a structural overhaul to solve its 
foundational problems”). An Article I court is a federal court organized under Article I of the United 
States Constitution, which confers upon Congress the power “[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the 
Supreme Court.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
228. See David A. Case, Article I Courts, Substantive Rights, and Remedies for Government 
Misconduct, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 101, 145 (2005). 
229. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
5_NANASI_45.2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/6/2021  12:12 PM 
298 N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 45:260 
Section will address Chevron’s applicability in cases involving immigration law, 
examine the waning strength of the Chevron doctrine, and explain why the BIA’s 
PSG definition should not be entitled to deference.  
1. Chevron and Its Applicability in Immigration Cases 
Chevron analysis is applicable to the decisions of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals because although the attorney general is the final interpreter of immigra-
tion laws,230 the AG has delegated this power to the Board.231 Several exceptions 
to the applicability of Chevron deference to the Board exist, however. Deference 
is only accorded to published BIA decisions232 and cases decided by a three-mem-
ber panel of the Board.233 A federal court also does not have to defer to the BIA 
if “neither the IJ’s nor BIA’s decision contains any analysis with persuasive 
power.”234 
The process for judicial review of agency decision-making under Chevron 
involves two steps, which are discussed in turn below.235 Step One requires a court 
to decide whether Congress has spoken to the question at issue. To determine this, 
a court looks at whether Congress’ intent is “clear” and “unambiguously ex-
pressed.”236 If the court determines, using traditional tools of statutory 
 
230. The INA provides that “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect 
to all questions of law shall be controlling.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2018). 
231. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (“The Attorney General, while 
retaining ultimate authority, has vested the BIA with power to exercise the ‘discretion and authority 
conferred upon the Attorney General by law’ in the course of considering and determining cases 
before it.”); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is well-estab-
lished that Congress delegated to the BIA the authority to promulgate rules, on behalf of the Attorney 
General, that carry the force of law ‘through a process of case-by-case adjudication.’” (quoting 
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425)). 
232. Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have held that 
the Board’s precedential orders, which bind third parties, qualify for Chevron deference because 
they are made with a ‘lawmaking pretense.’ We have not accorded Chevron deference to the Board’s 
unpublished decisions, however, because they do not bind future parties.” (citations omitted)). 
233. Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1012–13 (holding that a case must be decided by a three-
member panel if it presents “[t]he need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws, 
regulations, or procedures”) (alteration in original). Only a small number of cases are decided by a 
three-member panel; panel decision are reserved for times when the BIA is required “to settle incon-
sistencies among the rulings of different immigration judges,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(i) (2020); “to 
establish a precedent,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(ii) (2020); “to resolve a case or controversy of major 
national import,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(iv) (2020); or “to resolve a complex, novel, unusual, or 
recurring issue of law or fact,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(vii) (2020). More often, a single Board mem-
ber will “affirm the decision of . . . the immigration judge, without opinion. . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(e)(4)(i) (2020). 
234. Mendis v. Filip, 554 F.3d 335, 338 n.3 (2d Cir. 2009). 
235. Professor Cass Sunstein, among others, has argued that Chevron also has a “Step Zero,” 
wherein federal courts should determine whether Chevron is applicable. See generally Cass R. Sun-
stein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006). 
236. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
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construction, that Congress expressed its intent, that intent must control.237 If, 
however, the court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous, it can infer 
that Congress intended to vest definitional authority in the agency that regularly 
administers in that area of law. The court then moves to Step Two of the Chevron 
analysis.  
The goal of Step Two is to decide whether the agency’s approach is “based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”238 The Court has generally defined 
“permissible” as either “reasonable”239 or not “arbitrary or capricious.”240 In mak-
ing its Step Two determination, a court can review the text, structure, and purpose 
of the statute.241 But if, after doing so, a court finds that the agency did not “pro-
vide a reasoned explanation for its action”242 or that the outcome is unreasonable, 
it fails at Step Two and its action cannot stand. 
2. The Waning Strength of the Chevron Doctrine 
Although Chevron is a pillar of administrative law jurisprudence,243 scholars 
argue that its “importance is fading,”244 noting that in “recent years, we have seen 
a growing call from the federal bench, on the Hill, and within the legal academy 
to rethink administrative law’s deference doctrines to federal agency interpreta-
tions of law.”245 A full review of the critiques of Chevron is outside the scope of 
 
237. The Chevron Court stated that courts “must reject administrative constructions that are 
contrary to clear congressional intent.” Id. at 843 n.9. 
238. Id. at 843. 
239. See, e.g., id. at 845; Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 121 (2002). 
240. The reasonableness analysis of Chevron Step Two is similar to the “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2018). See Ken-
neth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 621 (2009) 
(“Courts and commentators have converged on an emerging consensus that the ‘arbitrary, capricious, 
and abuse of discretion’ standard set forth in Section 706(2)(A) supplies the metric for judicial over-
sight at Chevron’s second step.”). See also Nat’l Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 1000 (2005) (finding that an “arbitrary or capricious” deviation from previous agency 
policy was impermissible under a Chevron analysis); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52 n.7 (2011) 
(noting that the arbitrary and capricious standard used in Step 2 of the Chevron analysis was the 
same as arbitrary and capricious review under the Administrative Procedures Act). 
241. See, e.g., Troy Corp. v. Browder, 120 F.3d 277, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (requiring an 
agency’s interpretation to “be reasonable and consistent with the statutory purpose”). 
242. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45. The Court in Judulang further expounded that the bar is 
“not . . . high . . . but it is an unwavering one.” Id. 
243. Chevron is often described as the most cited decision in administrative law. See Jack M. 
Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
731, 731 (2014) (stating that Chevron is the most cited Supreme Court administrative law decision); 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investiga-
tion of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006) (labeling Chevron the most cited case in “mod-
ern public law”). 
244. Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 
59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 726–27 (2007). 
245. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 104 (2018). 
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this Article, but briefly, its legitimacy has been questioned on grounds that include 
concerns about separation of powers and a view that the doctrine vests too much 
power and authority in both the executive branch and the federal government as a 
whole.246 
A majority of the justices currently sitting on the Supreme Court have criti-
cized or call the Chevron doctrine into question. Justice Thomas authored a con-
curring opinion in Michigan v. EPA, writing separately solely to “note that [the 
EPA’s] request for deference raises serious questions about the constitutionality 
of our broader practice of deferring to agency interpretations of federal stat-
utes.”247 Thomas argued that Chevron was a threat to separation of powers, as it 
vested too much authority in the executive branch and precluded judges from ex-
ercising independent judgment.  
A few years earlier, Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissent joined by Justice 
Alito, in which he warned that “the danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed.”248 Justice Alito also questioned the ju-
diciary’s deference to agency interpretations of regulations in the 2015 case, Perez 
v. Mortgage Bankers Association.249 
Chevron critiques have also arisen in the Court’s examination of immigration 
law. In Pereira v. Sessions, a case in which the Court considered the validity of a 
notice to appear in immigration court that does not designate a specific time or 
place for the removal proceeding, Justice Kennedy drafted a concurrence, writing 
separately “to note [his] concern with the way in which the Court’s opinion in 
[Chevron] has come to be understood and applied.”250 He critiqued the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision-making process in another immigration case, Urbina v. Holder, 
arguing that the court’s limited “analysis suggests an abdication of the Judiciary’s 
 
246. Professor Christopher Walker recently published a detailed overview of Chevron cri-
tiques. See id. See also Emily Hammond, Elizabeth Garrett & M. Elizabeth Magill, Judicial Review 
of Statutory Issues Under the Chevron Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF 
FEDERAL AGENCIES 67 (2015). 
247. 576 U.S. 743, 760 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
248. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
249. 575 U.S. 92 (2015). Justice Alito’s concurring opinion addressed the Paralyzed Veterans 
doctrine, which required federal agencies to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking when they 
substantially altered an “interpretive” rule. See generally Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena 
L.P., 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997). He speculated that the “creation of that doctrine may have been 
prompted by an understandable concern about the aggrandizement of the power of administrative 
agencies as a result of the combined effect of (1) the effective delegation to agencies by Congress of 
huge swaths of lawmaking authority, . . . and (3) this Court’s cases holding that courts must ordinar-
ily defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.” 575 U.S. at 107–08 (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
250. 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Alito also used the Pe-
reira case as an opportunity to express his view that Chevron is an “increasingly maligned prece-
dent.” Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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proper role in interpreting federal statutes.”251 Kennedy concluded that he found 
“the type of reflexive deference exhibited in some of these cases . . . troubling.”252  
Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s replacement, Justice Kavanaugh, “indicated 
skepticism of the [Chevron] doctrine in both academic and judicial writings” prior 
to his confirmation to the Supreme Court.253 In a 2016 Harvard Law Review arti-
cle, he argued that the Chevron framework should not apply when “an agency is 
. . . interpreting a specific statutory term or phrase.”254 In a dissent in United States 
Telecom Association v. FCC, then-Judge Kavanaugh argued that “for an agency 
to issue a major rule, Congress must clearly authorize the agency to do so.”255 
Thus, if his past writings are any indication, Justice Kavanaugh may, like his pre-
decessor, join his colleagues in seeking to limit the Court’s deference to adminis-
trative agency decisions.  
Like Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch also expressed skepticism about the 
Chevron doctrine prior to his appointment to the Court. In Gutierrez-Brizuela v. 
Lynch, then-Judge Gorsuch raised separation-of-powers as well as other concerns, 
noting that “[t]ransferring the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to 
the executive unsurprisingly invites the very sort of due process (fair notice) and 
equal protection concerns the framers knew would arise if the political branches 
intruded on judicial functions.”256 He added that both “Chevron and Brand X per-
mit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legis-
lative power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little 
difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.”257 Thus, given 
his prior decisions, Justice Gorsuch would likely vote to limit Chevron’s reach in 
any case that came before the Supreme Court.258 
 
251. Id. at 2120. 
252. Id. 
253. CONG. RES. SERV., DEFERENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: WILL THE SUPREME COURT 
OVERRULE CHEVRON? 3 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10204.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7J6-
DCNF]. See also Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh, 
Chevron Deference, and the Supreme Court, REGUL. REV. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.theregre-
view.org/2018/09/03/barnett-boyd-walker-kavanaugh-chevron-deference-supreme-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/MP5F-DTYK] (reviewing decisions authored by then-Judge Kavanaugh in an ef-
fort to predict how he might review federal agency statutory interpretations that come before him on 
the Court). 
254. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2154 
(2016) (book review). 
255. 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
256. 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
257. Id. at 1149. 
258. See Trevor W. Ezell & Lloyd Marshall, If Goliath Falls: Judge Gorsuch and the Admin-
istrative State, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 175–76 (2017) (discussing then-Judge Gorsuch’s anti-
Chevron views). 
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Finally, although Justice Amy Coney Barrett does not have an extensive rec-
ord on administrative law matters,259 she too may be inclined to limit Chevron 
deference. Experts who have studied Barrett’s record and writings believe that her 
commitment to textualism and her expressed willingness to overrule precedential 
cases may make her open to revisiting the doctrine.260 
In sum, one might assume that the increasingly conservative Supreme Court 
would be reluctant to expand protections to immigrants. However, if the Court 
does intervene to resolve the circuit split regarding the definition of particular so-
cial group, support for a return to the Acosta standard may come from the Court’s 
desire to uphold its preferred values in the area of administrative law.261 
3. The BIA’s Definition of “Particular Social Group” Does Not Merit 
Chevron Deference 
Whether the Supreme Court or federal courts of appeals should afford Chev-
ron deference to the definition of particular social group promulgated by the Board 
of Immigration Appeals is, of course, more than just a matter of who sits on those 
courts. A closer analysis of Chevron and the BIA’s jurisprudence reveals that the 
Board’s interpretation of the phrase “particular social group” fails at Chevron Step 
Two.262  
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ PSG definition is unreasonable for two 
distinct reasons: (i) it is not in keeping with Congress’ intent for the Refugee Act 
to comport with international law and obligations; and (ii) the Board’s actions 
have defined the PSG out of existence, which cannot be a reasonable outcome. As 
such, deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation is no longer 
appropriate.  
 
259. Evan Bernick, Judge Amy Coney Barrett on Statutory Interpretation: Textualism, Prec-
edent, Judicial Restraint, and the Future of Chevron, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 3, 
2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/judge-amy-coney-barrett-on-statutory-interpretation-textual-
ism-precedent-judicial-restraint-and-the-future-of-chevron-by-evan-bernick/ [https://perma.cc/4N
ME-N5NE] (noting that “then-Professor Barrett didn’t write much about administrative law while 
at Notre Dame Law School” and that Barrett did not write any opinions “in any major administrative 
law case” during her tenure on the Seventh Circuit). 
260. Id. See also Jeff Overley, Chevron Deference’s Future in Doubt if Barrett is Confirmed, 
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1318381/chevron-deference-s-future-in-
doubt-if-barrett-is-confirmed; James Goodwin, Will Confirming Judge Barrett be the Death of 
Chevron Deference?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCI. BLOG (Oct. 15, 2020, 2:21 PM), 
https://blog.ucsusa.org/guest-commentary/will-confirming-judge-barrett-be-the-death-of-chevron-
deference [https://perma.cc/RA8Z-ZMTD]. 
261. Some have expressed concern about this “circuit conflict on an issue where national uni-
formity is vital.” Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting). 
262. The BIA’s interpretation of PSG likely satisfies Chevron Step One because Congress did 
not explicitly express its intent regarding the definition of particular social group when enacting the 
Refugee Act of 1980, nor is the term defined in the statute or in the implementing regulations. See 
supra Section II.B. 
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i. The BIA’s Definition of “Particular Social Group” Is Incon-
sistent with Congressional Intent  
There exists no single definition for what constitutes a “reasonable” agency 
interpretation under Chevron Step Two, but scholars have suggested that “by ‘rea-
sonable,’ the Court seemed to mean reasonable in light of the text, history, and 
interpretative conventions that govern the interpretation of a statute by a court.”263 
The Supreme Court itself has explained that “reasonable statutory interpretation 
must account for both ‘the specific context in which . . . language is used’ and ‘the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.’”264 Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
held that Chevron deference does not apply to an agency interpretation that is not 
“rationally related to the goals of the statute.”265 
Although legislative history regarding the PSG definition is absent,266 great 
clarity exists with respect to congressional intent regarding the refugee definition 
and U.S. asylum law as a whole. An examination of the statute reveals that the 
current “particular social group” definition is not in keeping with the history, con-
text, or goals of the 1980 Refugee Act that created it. As such, the BIA’s interpre-
tation of the term cannot be considered reasonable under Chevron.  
First, there is no question that Congress intended that the Refugee Act “be 
interpreted in conformance with the [1967] Protocol’s definition.”267 As the Su-
preme Court stated in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new defini-
tion of ‘refugee’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act it is that one of 
Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee 
law into conformance with the [Protocol] . . . Indeed, the defini-
tion of ‘refugee’ that Congress adopted . . . is virtually identical 
to the one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Convention . . .268 
As such, the phrase “particular social group” must be understood within the 
broader context of a statute that both originated in international law and sought to 
 
263. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 977 
(1992) (emphasis added). 
264. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014) (citing Robinson v. Shell 
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). See also Albuquerque Indian Rights v. Lujan, 930 F.2d 49, 59 
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (explaining that the canons of construction in [the court’s] review of administrative 
decisions [is] normally . . . limited to determining whether or not the agency interpretation is ‘ra-
tional and consistent with the statute’” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
265. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388 (1999); Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am. 
v. FTC, 790 F.3d 198, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Vill. of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 
F.3d 650, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
266. See supra note 26. 
267. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987). 
268. Id. at 436. The Court added that “there were . . . many statements indicating Congress’ 
intent that the new statutory definition of ‘refugee’ be interpreted in conformance with the Protocol’s 
definition.” Id. at 437. 
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maintain a strong connection between domestic asylum law and international ref-
ugee law.  
Moreover, Congress passed the Refugee Act in 1980, nearly thirty years after 
“particular social group” was defined in the Refugee Convention. In the interven-
ing time, both international bodies and States had begun to give meaning to the 
otherwise ambiguous term. Thus, “although the United States Congress may not 
have articulated the meaning it intended for social group-based persecution, a sub-
stantial body of academic, administrative, and judicial interpretations of this term 
had developed, and Congress gave no indication that it intended to reject those 
developments.”269  
As Professor Bassina Farbenblum has explained, “the Refugee Act is one of 
a small number of incorporative statutes that directly incorporate international 
treaty language and concepts into U.S. domestic law.”270 Yet the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals’ definition of “particular social group” has caused “domestic asy-
lum law [to] become jurisprudentially unmoored from international refugee 
law.”271 The United States’ particular social group requirements are now signifi-
cantly more stringent than those applied in every other developed country;272 they 
also disregard the approach suggested by UNHCR. The increasing detachment 
from international jurisprudence created by the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
interpretation of PSG squarely contravenes congressional intent.  
Lastly, in addition to seeking to align domestic and international refugee law, 
Congress also passed the Refugee Act with a recognition of the underlying aims 
of the statute.273 As the BIA itself recognized, “it is important to keep in mind the 
fundamental humanitarian concerns of asylum law.”274 The court noted that “in 
enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress sought to bring the Act’s definition 
of ‘refugee’ into conformity with the United Nations Convention and Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and, in so doing, give ‘statutory meaning to our 
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns.’”275 And as a 
result of this context, the Board held that the asylum system should “afford a gen-
erous standard for protection in cases of doubt,” an axiom that should extend to 
the definition of “particular social group.”276 Despite its prior benevolent 
 
269. Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due 
to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 514 (1993). 
270. Farbenblum, supra note 53, at 1069. 
271. Id. at 1059. 
272. See Marouf, supra note 44, at 56–57. 
273. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 § 101(a) (1980) (“The Con-
gress declares that it is the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of 
persons subject to persecution in their homelands, including, where appropriate, humanitarian assis-
tance for their care and maintenance in asylum areas.”). 
274. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492 (B.I.A. 1998). 
275. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, as reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144). 
276. Id. 
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language, the effect of, and perhaps arguably the motivation behind, the BIA’s 
imposition of additional requirements onto the Acosta immutability test has been 
to exclude many in need from lifesaving legal protections.277 
In sum, the Board of Immigration Appeals’ PSG definition is not in keeping 
with either the intent of Congress to conform the Refugee Act to international law, 
specifically the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and to comport with in-
ternational obligations. It also disregards the humanitarian underpinnings of U.S. 
asylum law. Consequently, when considering the history of the statute in which 
PSG was established and “the broader context of the statute as a whole” the 
Board’s interpretation of the phrase “particular social group” must be unreasona-
ble under Chevron Step Two.278 
ii. The BIA’s Definition Cannot Be Reasonable Because It Has 
Defined the Particular Social Group out of Existence 
As the Supreme Court has stated, “[e]ven under Chevron’s deferential frame-
work, agencies must operate ‘within the bounds of reasonable interpreta-
tion.’”279 Reasonableness, as mentioned above, has no precise definition, but in-
creasingly, “[a]rguments for narrowing Chevron at Step Two call for a more 
searching analysis regarding what should constitute a ‘reasonable’ interpreta-
tion.”280 
A growing number of courts are placing limits on what constitutes reasonable 
for Chevron purposes. For example, “[a]gencies are not free, under Chevron, to 
generate erratic, irreconcilable interpretations of their governing statutes.”281 The 
D.C. Circuit stated that deference is not “owed to any agency action that is based 
on an agency’s purported expertise where the agency’s explanation for its action 
lacks any coherence.”282 When an agency interprets a statutory term in a manner 
that conflicts with its prior positions and does not provide an plausible explanation 
 
277. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (1997) (noting that “divorcing international and domestic law tends to 
operate to the grave detriment of asylum-seekers.”). See also Farbenblum, supra note 53, at 1121 
(“Interpreting the INA consistently with the Convention will invariably provide a more rights-pro-
tective framework than the domestic immigration statute alone.”). 
278. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014). See also Negusie v. Holder, 
555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009) (holding that “concepts of international law . . . may be persuasive in 
determining whether a particular agency interpretation is reasonable”). 
279. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 321. 
280. Walker, supra note 245, at 118. See also Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1411 (2017) (“The Supreme Court has shown 
substantially greater willingness to invalidate agency interpretations at Chevron step two.”). 
281. Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J., dissenting) 
(citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)). 
282. Fox v. Clinton, 684 F.3d 67, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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for that departure, Chevron deference may not apply.283 Lastly, an unreasonable 
outcome may also cause an agency’s interpretation to fail at Step Two.284 
In Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA satisfied federal 
courts’ concerns about the social visibility element by clarifying the requirement 
and renaming it social distinction. However, the Board has still not provided an 
explanation for the tension between the social distinction and particularity ele-
ments. In fact, in both Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- the court con-
ceded the “considerable overlap” between particularity and social distinction and 
could not offer an example of a group that would be both socially distinct and 
particular.285 Even DHS has advocated for the two requirements to be com-
bined.286  
In Mellouli v. Lynch, a case considering whether possession of drug parapher-
nalia was a deportable offense, the Supreme Court held that if an agency’s inter-
pretation does not lead to a sensible outcome, deference is not appropriate.287 The 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ definition of particular social group has led to a 
result that, like in Mellouli, “makes scant sense.”288 It has crafted a definition of 
particular social group whose requirements—social distinction and particularity—
are mutually exclusive. This has led to only two PSGs being recognized since the 
imposition of the new elements, both of which have since been overruled by at-
torneys general largely on social distinction and particularity grounds.  
As the Supreme Court stated in Judulang v. Holder, “[t]he BIA may well have 
legitimate reasons for [making a decision, b]ut still, it must do so in some rational 
way. . . . [T]he BIA’s approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of 
the immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration system.”289 
Here, the Board has effectively defined the particular social group out of existence, 
which is neither a rational nor a reasonable result. It is, like in Judulang, an out-
come “unmoored from the purposes and concerns of the immigration laws. . . . [I]t 
 
283. See Nat’l Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (find-
ing that an “[u]nexplained inconsistency is . . . a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbi-
trary and capricious change from agency practice”). 
284. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for 
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 315 (1996). 
285. See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 
Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014). 
286. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 253 n.11 (explaining that DHS “argued for 
the combination of the ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ requirements into a single ‘social dis-
tinction’ requirement because of the close relationship between the two concepts”). 
287. 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1982 (2015). The Court explained that the Board’s decision led to “[t]he 
incongruous upshot . . . that an alien is not removable for possessing a substance controlled only un-
der Kansas law, but he is removable for using a sock to contain that substance.” Id. It ultimately held 
that, because the BIA’s decision “makes scant sense, [its] interpretation is owed no deference under 
the doctrine described in Chevron.” Id. 
288. Id. 
289. 565 U.S. 42, 55 (2011). 
5_NANASI_45.2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/6/2021  12:12 PM 
2021] DEATH OF THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 307 
is not supported by text or practice or cost considerations. The BIA’s approach 
therefore cannot pass muster under ordinary principles of administrative law.”290 
iii. The Rule of Lenity 
Lastly, another consideration relevant to the Chevron analysis is the rule of 
lenity, a principle of statutory interpretation originating in criminal law that re-
quires a court to construe ambiguity in the manner most favorable to the defend-
ant.291 The rule of lenity was first applied in the immigration context in Fong Haw 
Tan v. Phelan, when the Supreme Court stated that because “deportation is a dras-
tic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile,” deportation pro-
visions should be strictly construed in favor of the noncitizen.292 As the Court 
explained, “since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume 
that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the 
narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”293  
The rule of lenity is firmly established in immigration law.294 Its relationship 
to Chevron, however, is more uncertain. In 2017, the Supreme Court declined to 
decide whether Chevron deference or the rule of lenity should be prioritized.295 
When to consider the rule of lenity also remains an open question. As Professor 
David Rubenstein has noted, courts’ “treatment of the issue has . . . been quite 
varied. Indeed, just about every conceivable approach has been employed or 
 
290. Id. at 64. 
291. Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the rule of lenity as 
the “judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out 
multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient pun-
ishment”). 
292. Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). Deportation can lead to more than exile; 
in certain cases, it can lead to death. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, When Deportation is a Death Sentence, 
NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-
is-a-death-sentence [https://perma.cc/ZEV2-GYBL]; Chris Gelardi, The Tragic Story of Jimmy Al-
daoud, Deported from the Streets of Detroit to His Death in Iraq, INTERCEPT (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/08/08/ice-deportation-iraq-jimmy-aldaoud/ [https://perma.cc/P26R-
DTL7]. 
293. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10. 
294. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (describing the “longstanding 
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien”); 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND 
AMERICA 156 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1987) (stating that the rule of lenity is “[t]he most important 
rule of statutory interpretation peculiar to immigration”). 
295. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1572 (2017) (“We have no need to re-
solve whether the rule of lenity or Chevron receives priority in this case because the statute, read in 
context, unambiguously forecloses the Board’s interpretation. Therefore, neither the rule of lenity 
nor Chevron applies.”). Many scholars have also analyzed the rule of lenity and its relation to Chev-
ron. See, e.g., Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 
(2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990). 
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suggested by the circuit courts . . .”296 Scholars and the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals are similarly divided. Professor Rebecca Sharpless has argued that the rule 
of lenity should apply at Step Zero.297 In Matter of Small, Board Member Lory 
Rosenberg stated that the rule should apply at Step One.298 Other scholars have 
argued that it is applicable at Step Two299 and even “at the very end of the pro-
cess—after the court determines both that the statute is ambiguous under step one 
and [that deference is not warranted because] the agency’s interpretation is unrea-
sonable under step two.”300  
Ultimately, while the precise relationship of the rule of lenity to the Chevron 
doctrine continues to be debated, what is certain is that the rule serves as another 
mitigating factor against any deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals that 
would result in draconian outcomes for asylum seekers.  
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted the Refugee Act in 1980, it declared that asylum 
seekers were “of special humanitarian concern to the United States,” and high-
lighted “the historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of 
persons subject to persecution in their homelands.”301 From its origin, U.S. asy-
lum law was intended to conform with international refugee law, which is an ex-
pansive and rights-protective doctrine.302 In generating particular social group ju-
risprudence that does not allow any applicants to qualify, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals has abrogated both its legal and moral responsibilities to 
those seeking refuge in the United States.  
The particular social group ground is the mechanism by which many who are 
facing grave violence at the hands of gangs, their intimate partners, or their 
 
296. David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its Proper Place: A Tool 
of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 502–04 (2007) (identifying nine discrete ap-
proaches undertaken by federal courts when attempting to reconcile the rule of lenity and Chevron 
deference). 
297. See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, Zone of Nondeference: Chevron and Deportation for a 
Crime, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 323, 377 n.88 (2017) (“Like the criminal rule of lenity, the presumption 
against deportation in immigration cases arguably kicks in at Chevron step zero—when courts are 
deciding whether Chevron even applies in the first place.”). 
298. In re Small, 23 I. & N. Dec. 448, 454 (B.I.A. 2002) (Rosenberg, Mem., dissenting) (stat-
ing that the rule of lenity “maintains its currency today and applies even to interpretations of the 
plain language of the statute under the first prong of the test prescribed in Chevron”). 
299. See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 
17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 575 (2003) (arguing that the rule of lenity should be considered in Step 
Two of the Chevron analysis, as part of a court’s determination of whether an agency’s interpretation 
is reasonable). 
300. Rubenstein, supra note 296, at 504. 
301. Refugee Act of 1980 § 101(a), Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
302. See Farbenblum, supra note 53, at 1063 (noting that the international refugee law frame-
work has a rights-protective purpose). 
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families seek solace and protection. Out of a misplaced fear of opening floodgates, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals has effectively closed our borders to them. We 
must do what we can to save a legal doctrine that stands to save so many lives.303  
 
303. See SHANE DIZON & NADINE WETTSTEIN, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 10:137 (2d ed. 
2008) (“After political opinion claims, the largest body of U.S. asylum and withholding jurispru-
dence is based upon claims of membership in a particular social group.”). 
